

# WHAT SHOULD BE AMERICA'S NEXT POST 9-11 GRAND STRATEGY?

BY

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Some believe that America has had no real grand strategy since the end of the cold war. Critics argue that the Bush Doctrine and America's "War on Terror" is not a true grand strategy because it lacks a coherent unifying framework, is highly resource intensive, and is unsustainable over the long term. America is at the pinnacle of its global power and influence, but it will not last forever. Many recommend that America should use this valuable time to develop a grand strategy to place it in favorable future position. A well thought out and articulated grand strategy should result in national security, economic prosperity, fulfilled national interests, and favorable political outcomes. Ultimately, for the sake of America's grand destiny, it is important we get our next grand strategy right. This project examines the definition, concept, framework, an example of good grand strategy, our current grand strategy, and our strategic environment. This project identifies proposed grand strategies, narrows the field against selected elimination criteria, compares and contrasts remaining strategies, and recommends which one should become America's next post 9-11 Grand Strategy for the Twenty First Century.



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## WHAT SHOULD BE AMERICA'S NEXT POST 9-11 GRAND STRATEGY?

### CHAPTER I WHAT IS GRAND STRATEGY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

Leaders should not be unfamiliar with strategy. Those who understand it will survive. Those who do not will perish.<sup>1</sup>

Sun Tzu

**Introduction.** Picture if you will, soldiers sitting around a camp fire at night discussing the day's earlier battle. They talk of winning tactics employed during the heat of battle, boast of their bravery in combat, and show off their battle scars.

Close by is a large tent filled with military officers standing around a large table filled with maps of various sizes depicting unit locations. Gathering around a lantern, the officers discuss and plan the current campaign. Their adversary is becoming bolder, more adaptive, and cunning. They review their operational plans carefully realizing that victory will be hard earned.

Some distance away, there is a castle upon a hill. Inside the council chambers, the king is surrounded by his ministers discussing the future of the kingdom. The protracted war is costly in blood and treasure. Statesmen and high officials of the realm are engaged in heated debates on the best strategic options for winning the war.

Other ministers see long term grand visions beyond the war to achieve security, peace, and unite the people. Much at stake because serious miscalculations could lead to their nation's ruin, but wise grand strategy will lead to favorable outcomes and prosperity. They carefully consider the merits of the overarching strategies, weigh the options, and ask the king to make a final decision on their state's next grand strategy.

This analogy provided a basic illustration of the three levels of war fighting: tactical, operational, and strategic. With that as an introductory basis, this project focuses on the highest level of strategy – grand strategy.

**Project Scope.** This research project will review grand strategy: (1) basics in **Chapter I**, (2) ideology and mechanics in **Chapter II**, (3) an example in **Chapter III**, (4) reasons for needing a new one in **Chapter IV**, (5) strategic environment in **Chapter V**, (6) review strategies in **Chapter VI**, and (7) make final recommendations in **Chapter VII**.

### **Defining Grand Strategy and Understanding Its Purpose and Role**

What actually is grand strategy? Let's start by examining some definitions contributed by academicians, strategists, and leaders that best highlight grand strategy's distinguishing characteristics and attributes to articulate its unique purpose and role. Yale University's International Security Studies (ISS) Grand Strategy academic program defines grand strategy as: "a plan of action that is based on the calculated relationship of means to large ends."<sup>2</sup> Robert Crane sees a "holistic strategic design for the pursuit of policy goals."<sup>3</sup> Barry Posen calls grand strategy "a state's theory about how to best cause security for itself."<sup>4</sup> Gary Hart contributes a synergistic, principle based, and rallying definition:

The application of power and resources to achieve large national purposes...central organizing principle around which political and military policies could be shaped, resources mustered, and the public engaged...The highest type of strategy in how it defines its national interests and responds to threats.<sup>5</sup>

The U.S. Army College (Joint Pub 1-02) presents a synchronized effort definition as "an overarching strategy summarizing the national vision for developing, applying, and coordinating all the instruments of national power in order to accomplish grand strategic

objectives.”<sup>6</sup> Finally, strategist John R. Boyd offers grand strategy definition that provides a magnetic, illuminating, and resonating role for stimulating national vigor and strength:

A grand ideal, an overarching theme, or noble philosophy that represents a coherent paradigm within which individuals as well as societies can shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances – yet offers a way to expose flaws of competing or adversary systems. Such a unifying vision should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or beacon around which evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or organic whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things.<sup>7</sup>





Figure 1. Grand Strategy Elements.<sup>8</sup>

This project uses all mentioned grand strategy definitions to emphasize its many unique qualities. **Figure 1** illustrates the combined features of grand strategy essence which are: (1) visionary –future oriented, (2) guiding – symbolic principle oriented, (3) calculating - the ways and means, (4) interpreting – daily events and crisis, (5) means - the instruments of national power, and (6) ends.<sup>9</sup> The focal point of a grand strategy

definition is understanding the working relationship of the national “ends, ways, and means” trilogy (**Figure 2**).<sup>10</sup> All elements must work together to produce the “ends.”<sup>11</sup>



**Figure 2. Towards a Definition of Grand Strategy.**<sup>12</sup>

The most important aspect of grand strategy is its “ends” (**Figure 2**) which supplies its importance, purpose, and meaning.<sup>13</sup> If the basic ends are wrong, all other aspects become irrelevant.<sup>14</sup>

**Are Grand Strategy and Foreign Policy the Same Thing?** They are not synonymous and there is a difference. Both deal with using the full range of national instruments of power to achieve goals and are often decided by the same leaders.<sup>15</sup> The discerning difference is how grand strategy intends use the military to achieve its overall goals as well as its foreign policy goals.<sup>16</sup> Strategist Colin Dueck emphasizes that “grand strategy is a branch of foreign policy and grand strategic outcomes are a subset of foreign policy outcomes.”<sup>17</sup>

**Is Grand Strategy to be Kept Secret?** After 1947, America discontinued the practice of keeping grand strategy secret, clouded, or distorted by misinformation like military strategy can be.<sup>18</sup> Today, the nation's top leaders must ensure that grand strategy is well publicized, constantly promoted, transparent, and known by its citizens.<sup>19</sup> The ancient Greeks began this democratic tradition of openness by initiating the “Periclean Precedent” – that “grand strategy is a matter for public discussion.”<sup>20</sup> The public should consider grand strategy as “the rudder of national effort.”<sup>21</sup>

### **Judging and Testing Sensible Grand Strategy**

**How shall we judge grand strategy?** At its basic outcome, grand strategy's worth is judged by its ability to deliver favorable outcomes.<sup>22</sup> Mead Earle stresses it should seek to make the option of war unnecessary or if we must go to war, then it should maximize our “potential for victory”<sup>23</sup> However, achieving victory or winning is simply not enough. Grand strategy must also lead to national prosperity, not bankruptcy or national ruin (pyrrhic victory).<sup>24</sup> Grand strategy must also be framed by legitimacy by using international legitimate governance, mandates, and justified by national ideology.<sup>25</sup> Since grand strategy can last for decades or even centuries, Greek historian Thucydides wrote that “the lens of history” will ultimately reveal its success or failure.<sup>26</sup> However, Carl von Clausewitz wrote that “role of chance” impacts grand strategy “which at times can defeat the best of designs and at other times hand victory to the worse of them.”<sup>27</sup>

**What constitutes a wise or sensible grand strategy?** Strategist John Boyd recommends that the test of a good grand strategy is if it can: (1) support national goals, (2) improve national fitness to shape and cope with a continuously changing global

environment, (3) invigorate national resolve, drain away your adversary's resolve, and attract the uncommitted, (4) end conflicts on favorable terms, and (5) ensure that conflicts and peace terms do not provide seeds for future conflict.<sup>28</sup>


### **What is Grand Strategy's Place in the World?**

How does grand strategy fit into the scheme of things? There are different types and levels of strategy hierarchy. **Figure 3** illustrates grand strategy's relationship to responsibility, time, and scope as well as to war planning.



**Figure 3. Hierarchy of Strategy.**<sup>29</sup>

There are different levels of strategy (tactical, operational, to strategic) (**Figure 3**) and different types of strategy (like national security strategy, national military strategy, and economic strategy). Each of these strategies is designed to achieve specific goals, objectives, and operate in different spheres of time, space, and distance.<sup>30</sup> Strategy can vary in level of responsibility, in geographical focus, as well as in scope. This project will concentrate on the highest level of national strategy – grand strategy.



**Figure 4. Grand Strategy and Theory Relationships.**<sup>31</sup>


Simply put, grand strategy operates at the nation's highest strategic plane of geopolitical influence (Figure 4) relying on the “correctness” of strategic assessments, based on its political, theoretical, and philosophical underpinnings for its effectiveness.<sup>32</sup> John Ikenberry, Princeton University Professor, describes these interrelationships as:

Grand strategies are really bundles of security, economic, and political strategies based on assumptions about how to best to advance national security and build international order.<sup>33</sup>

### **Conceptual Framework of Grand Strategy**

Figure 5 provides a conceptual illustration to aide in grasping how the various elements come together to provide linkage, cohesion, and synergistic output to create the ideal grand strategy effect. First, grand strategy's basic foundation is rooted in a country's character (national identity, history, demographics, political institutions) and physical environment (geography and natural resources).<sup>34</sup> Additional foundations are

domestic support, political will, national values, principles, goals, interests, and the identification of the strategic threats. Three strong pillars symbolize grand strategy's ends, ways, and means which are calculated and coordinated to



**Figure 5. Grand Strategy Conceptual Framework.<sup>35</sup>**

achieve national interests. National policies are framed within the context of the grand strategy.<sup>36</sup> The upper super structure, **Figure 5**, consists of the instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military, economic, political, technological, ideological, and culture).<sup>37</sup> Included is a layer of “soft and hard power,” as coined by Joseph Nye, Harvard University Professor, that produced a “winning combination” in helping to win the cold war.<sup>38</sup> Hard power is the nation’s use of military (sticks) and economic (carrots) influence.<sup>39</sup> Nye defines soft power as the ability to shape desired outcomes “without tangible threats, coercion, or payoff.”<sup>40</sup> American soft power uses its cultural influence (ranging from blue jeans, music, movies, celebrities, to higher education), ideals,

values, principles, and policies.<sup>41</sup> Soft power makes America appear attractive, appealing, and alluring to foreigners (to like America and willfully support it).<sup>42</sup> Next is a layer of specific and shorter term strategies.

The roof of grand strategy, **Figure 5**, is angled upwards symbolizing its future orientation, broad, and long term scope.<sup>43</sup> A beacon symbolizes the transmission of a unifying vision which Walter Mead calls a “messianic dimension.”<sup>44</sup> Grand strategy endures constant pressure and stress from external and internal sources due and is flexible to deal with changing conditions.<sup>45</sup> It is also broad and ambiguous enough for use and interpretation by different Presidential administrations in applying it to the crisis of the day.<sup>46</sup> Grand strategy seeks to “prioritize and rank order” national interests<sup>47</sup> (see **Figure 6**) as well as “strike a balance” (see **Figure 8**).<sup>48</sup>

## DEVELOPING GRAND STRATEGY

**How is Grand Strategy Developed?** Theorist Christopher Layne considers grand strategy development as a three step process: (1) determine the nation’s vital interests (see **Chapter I**), (2) identify the threats to those national interests (see **Chapter V**), and (3) decide how to best to employ the instruments of national power to protect those interests (see **Chapters VI and VII**).<sup>49</sup> Grand strategy is applied and adjusted over time to respond appropriately to changing conditions.<sup>50</sup> James C. Gaston contends that we must ask four fundamental questions in its development:<sup>51</sup> (1) Why do we need a grand strategy? (See **Chapter V**) (Does the absence of a grand strategy matter? What is the underlying rationale and justification for needing one?) (2) What new dangers might a grand strategy present? (See **Chapter I**) (What new dilemmas, paradigms, or paradoxes might it create?) (3) Shall we look to the future or to past for

such a strategy? (See **Chapters II**) (4) What is the adequacy of such a strategy? (See **Chapter I**)

Robert J. Art recommends that we must ask another set of four questions.<sup>52</sup>

- (1) What are America's international interests and what are the threats to those interests? (See **Chapters I and V**)
- (2) What possible grand strategies can be developed to protect America's interests from those threats? (See **Chapter VI**.)
- (3) Which of these grand strategies best protects America's interests? (Identified, compared, and contrasted in **Chapter VII**)
- (4) What specific policies or military capabilities are required to support the grand strategy chosen? (See **Chapter VII**.)


**Who decides grand strategy?** Carl von Clausewitz wrote that a nation's grand strategy is the substance "for ministers and kings."<sup>53</sup> Rather, grand strategy is decided by the nation's political elite. The National Security Council (NSC) is considered to be America's guardian of grand strategy decision making.<sup>54</sup> The President's closest advisors comprise a special "inter circle" of strategic decision makers which include the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, Director of the CIA, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who require a presidential decision.<sup>55</sup> This governmental decision making group can vary in composition and is flexible, but does not usually extend beyond five or six members.<sup>56</sup> Strategic alternates are offered and debated within this circle, but the President makes the final decision.<sup>57</sup>

### **National Interests – Grand Strategy's Ends**

National interests are the "ends" of grand strategy (the state's collective good) in advancing a country's international goals, aims, or ambitions (our nation's greater purposes) and are used to "define the broad purposes of U.S. foreign policy."<sup>58</sup>

The President bears the responsibility for defining the national interests with congressional consent.<sup>59</sup> The **major categories (Figure 6)** of national interests are:


1. **Unchanging Interests** (long term, core, enduring) – which include homeland defense, economic well being, favorable world order, and promotion of national values and principles which are deeply rooted in national historical and traditional culture, and
2. **Changing Interests** (short term, situational, modified) – which are developed and adjusted according to the changing international environment.<sup>60</sup>



**Figure 6. National Interests.**<sup>61</sup>


There are **four** types of national interests (**Figure 6 and Figure 7**): (1) **Survival Interests** – deal with critical and imminent threats; requires immediate action, such as deterring an attack on U.S. soil, (2) **Vital Interests** – are concerned with dangerous threats; serious national harm occurs unless strong action is taken, but the nation has time to prepare a response, (3) **Major Interests** – major harm could occur, but it is not crucial to the nation's overall well being, but it can be negotiated, (4) **Peripheral Interests** – these are bothersome and annoying; impacts private interests and bears

watching.<sup>62</sup> Survival and vital interests may require some military force while major and serious interests can usually be resolved through other instruments of national power.<sup>63</sup>



**Figure 7. National Interests and Threats.**<sup>64</sup>

**What are Grand Strategy's greater purposes?**<sup>65</sup> This issue evolves around national character or the very core essence of a country's identity. Therefore, greater purposes answers why a state exists, what it stands for, and what it wishes to promote throughout the world. A nation's citizens recognize larger purposes to be the grand master themes of their country, its aspirations, and inspiration. Greater purposes are the driving and unifying force that brings a nation together. Statesmen believe that America does not exist merely to provide self protection. A "global war on terror" does not equal a grand strategy. Pundits contend that "waging war" should be a part of a larger grand strategy equation. Scholars identify three greater purposes for America: (1) provide security, (2) expand opportunity, and (3) promote democracy (**Figure 7**).<sup>66</sup>




**Figure 8. Grand Strategy as a Balancing Act.<sup>67</sup>**

### **Grand Strategy is a Strategic Balancing Act of Risks, Odds, and Chances**

Grand strategy is a strategic balancing act of ends and means (Figure 8).<sup>68</sup> No country has an unlimited supply of resources. Nations have many broad international aims and face external threats, but lack the resources to accomplish them all. Therefore, states must prioritize and rank order their national interests. Grand strategists look to strike a politically acceptable “balance” between national commitments, liabilities, and interests. Walter Lippmann offers that “the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes.”<sup>69</sup> In other words, nations must adjust or align their ends (strategic ambitions) to their means (material resources).<sup>70</sup> Risk is balanced and calculated against the odds of probability.<sup>71</sup> A high probability and high harm threat would weigh heavily in consideration in grand strategy versus a low probability, low harm threat.<sup>72</sup>

## Grand Strategy is a Process of Adjustment

Yale University's Grand Strategy Program contributes that grand strategy is "not exact science, and requires flexibility and constant adjustment."<sup>72</sup> Dueck asserts that grand strategy is adjusted, over time, (Figure 9) by expanding and contracting according to a state's response to changing international and domestic conditions over the degree of liability its citizens are willing to bear.<sup>73</sup>




**Figure 9. Political Culture adjustments to Grand Strategy.**<sup>74</sup>

Political culture (political groups) influences grand strategy adjustment (Figure 9) in: (1) its methodology, (2) military spending, (3) foreign alliances, (4) overseas presence, (5) military deployments, (6) foreign aid, (7) diplomatic initiatives, and (8) national stance to adversaries.<sup>75</sup> Countries react to major changes in the international system by increasing or decreasing in these important areas, shifting political stances, or altering their methodology.<sup>76</sup>

## GRAND STRATEGY ADJUSTMENT

### Changing Threat Perceptions




**Figure 10. Grand Strategy Adjustments to Threats.**<sup>77</sup>

Grand strategy is also adjusted over time according to a states' response to perceived threats or changes in international power distribution (Figure 10).<sup>78</sup> When a nation becomes more powerful and perceives increased threats, the state tends to adopt a more expansive grand strategy.<sup>79</sup> When a country loses power, the nation tends to adopt a more economical and less expansive grand strategy.<sup>80</sup> Thucydides wrote "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."<sup>81</sup> In other words, the issue of one of global power politics - strong nations lead and weak nations tend to follow.

## Grand Strategy's Effectiveness

The effectiveness of Grand strategy is based on four variable combinations of constrained or unconstrained, commitment and capabilities. Strategist Arthur Stein identifies these four quadrants (**Figure 11**) as:



**Figure 11. Grand Strategy Effectiveness.**<sup>82</sup>


- (1) **Quad I Strategy** – (Constrained) Nations with constrained capabilities and commitments are unresponsive and non influential.
- (2) **Quad II Strategy** - (Understretch) States with constrained commitments and unconstrained capabilities are operating below their true potential to provide world influence (power outstrips policy).
- (3) **Quad III Strategy** – (Balance) Countries with unconstrained capabilities and commitments are in a favorable position to provide world influence.

(4) **Quad IV Strategy** – (Overstretch) Nations with constrained capabilities and unconstrained commitments have reached political overextension.<sup>83</sup>

### **Grand Strategy as Conceptual Levels of Influence**

This project proposes that there are three levels of grand strategy similar to “Maslow’s hierarchy of needs” for nations (**Figure 12**).<sup>84</sup> The basic ground level is grand duty or grand obligation whose grand strategy advances the “basic” national

## **Grand Strategy Levels**



**Figure 12. Grand Strategy Levels.**<sup>85</sup>

survival interests of the state.<sup>86</sup> Typical (non superpower) countries work at this level.

The second level (**Figure 12**) is the grand aim or grand ambition that advances a nation to “greater heights” of world power.<sup>87</sup> This is achieved through supremacy of hard and soft power. World powers or super powers reach this stage.

The third stage (**Figure 12**) is grand vision, aspiration, or ultimate “self actualization” of a state.<sup>88</sup> Nations envision achieving new world orders such as liberal internationalist orders or empires. Hyper powers reach this stage.

There are also resistance forces at work in grand strategy’s human calculation and risk such as complexity, uncertainty, change, such as Carl Von Clausewitz’s “fog and friction,” and Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns.”<sup>89</sup> Sir B.H Liddell Hart, British scholar, wrote that “the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita – still awaiting exploration and understanding.”<sup>90</sup>

## Principles of War and Grand Strategy




Figure 13. Principles of War and Grand Strategy Comparison.<sup>91</sup>

### Principles for Grand Strategy

As there are principles for war, there are also principles (**Figure 13**) for grand strategy.<sup>92</sup> Scholars and theorists contribute the following attributes: (1) **Ends** - ends

matter and ends matter most; effective - doing the right things, (2) Attainability, feasibility, and ambiguity, (3) Economical - cost, efficiency - doing things right, and sustainability - long term, (4) Tolerance and diversity (attraction and magnetism), (5) Support - political and domestic, (6) Unity of effort - synchronization and coordination, (7) Allies - coalitions, institutions, and organizations, (8) Legitimacy, (9) Flexibility, and (10) Vision and ideology – linkage (attached to national values and principles).<sup>93</sup>

While the principles of war are short term for decisive effect, the principles of grand strategy are broad in scope, long term to work in both war and peace.<sup>94</sup>

## Grand Strategy Nightmares




Figure 14. Grand Strategy Nightmares.<sup>95</sup>

### The Purpose of Grand Strategy and its Nightmares

The ultimate purpose of grand strategy is to defend the American people, our territory, and our way of life (the first order of ends – basic survival interests).<sup>96</sup> This makes America a free state (Figure 14). What would happen if we stray from this purpose? How would America react towards future crisis greater than 9-11? Would

this cause us to change our grand strategy? John Lewis Gaddis contends that “surprise attacks tend to sweep away old concepts of national security and what it takes to achieve it.”<sup>97</sup>

Strategist Michael Lind identifies four nightmare states (**Figure 14**) that could result in America’s overreaction:<sup>98</sup>

(1) **Tyranny State**: The nation’s highest leaders lose faith and patience in their government and organize a hostile military takeover or invoke a permanent Marshal Law. This would be like a scenario from the 1964 movie “Seven Days in May.”<sup>99</sup>

(2) **Garrison State**: The people pursue a grand strategy that requires them to surrender more liberty in return for more security from the state. Is America just one more terrorist attack away from becoming a police state like the novel “1984?”<sup>100</sup>

(3) **Tributary State**: The state decides to give up its sovereignty for collective security. This would be like the United States joining with Mexico and Canada to form a “North American Union” (to become assimilated into a larger super state).<sup>101</sup>

(4) **Castle State**: (Typical of failing states) The nation loses both credibility and centralized control. The people lose faith in their own government to protect them and pursue their own personal security. Will our grand strategy influence the world or will it change us? Will fear reign or will prudence prevail? In our vigorous zeal to deal with our external threats, we must guard against surrendering our liberty for security.<sup>102</sup>

**Grand Strategy’s Worse Case Scenario**:<sup>103</sup> Cass R. Sunstein’s book “Worse Case Scenario” suggests that “fear” is a very powerful motivator causing nations to “under react or overreact.” Fear has given rise to a new precautionary principle that if the risk of a terrible catastrophe is perceived as real, the state ought to respond aggressively to

prevent it. Strategic leaders need to question such assumed premises, understand the probability of external threats, and propose strategic responses to avoid unintended detrimental consequences. Sunstein believes that the greatest danger in crafting grand strategy is by “overreacting by imposing excessive precautions in the face of some risk; probability of neglect – wrongly treating highly improbable dangers as certainties.”<sup>104</sup> Our strategic assessments, and responses must be correct. Otherwise, our under reaction or excessive reaction wastes our nation’s time, efforts, and possibly lives - especially in the case of pre-emption or preventive war.


## **CHAPTER II. WHAT ARE THE FORCES AND ACTORS AT PLAY?**

It was us versus them, and we knew exactly who them was. Today, we’re not sure who the “they” are, but we know they are there.<sup>1</sup>

President George W. Bush


### **What Are The Schools Of Thought In Developing American Grand Strategy?**

American political and strategic culture allows the freedom to cultivate diverse strategic options (ideas, concepts, assessments, analytical tools, assumptions), policies, and recommendations from different schools of thought (**Figure 14**).<sup>2</sup> If political and domestic conditions are right, these groups rise to power advocate their own prescriptions for grand strategies.<sup>3</sup>



**Figure 15. Strategic Culture Influence on Grand Strategy.<sup>4</sup>**

Grand strategy's roots (philosophical and ideological underpinnings) are influenced by two schools of thought (Figure 15):<sup>5</sup> (1) **Idealism** (idealist, liberalist) - what we claim to believe in ourselves (morals, principles, reform, change), and (2) **Realism** (realist, pragmatist) - how we behave in practice (coping, equilibrium). These schools offer different explanations (Figure 16): for the nature of the international system (conceptualization of world order), the distribution of power, the behavior and motivation of nation states, and offer their own remedies for achieving world order and security.



**Figure 16. The Nature of Grand Strategy.<sup>6</sup>**

**How Do These Intellectual Schools Fit In With Grand Strategy?** Henry A. Kissinger sees a “fusion of strategy and values, by “merging practical with ideal.”<sup>7</sup> Inis L. Claude, contributes that these opposing views are “complimentary rather than competitive approaches to international affairs,” because successful grand strategy requires both to succeed.<sup>8</sup>

**Traditional American Grand Strategy.** Strategist Walter Mead identifies **four** American traditional approaches to grand strategy (**Figure 14**): (1) **Jeffersonian** – very narrow national security interests; national unity; non-interventionism, (2) **Jacksonian** – security of the American people; intensive and decisive use of force, (3) **Wilsonian** – idealism and cooperative security, and (4) **Hamiltonian** – broad national security interests; a realistic and restrained (prudent) use of force.<sup>9</sup>

**American Schools of Thought:**<sup>10</sup> Crusades and exemplarists are two major schools of thought who share America idealism and advocate grand strategy (democracy, free trade, liberal international world order) through opposing methodologies.

**Crusaders** (Realist or Interventionist) insist on complete global freedom of maneuver without restraints (interests before institutions), and will, if necessary: (1) break down any barriers preventing action, (2) use force through intervention to root out bad regimes, and (3) remake the world in order to make it safer (tame the jungle).<sup>11</sup>

**Exemplarists** (Idealist or Non-interventionist) insist on using civilized “peaceful” restraint by example, through (1) diplomacy, (2) nonintervention, and (3) world cooperation via institutions (cultivate a global garden by building a world community).<sup>12</sup>

**Major Strategic Culture Groups.** There are **four** major political culture groups which influence grand strategy (**Figure 14**) development from a national or global perspective which are: (1) Nationalists, (2) Internationalists, (3) Realists, and (4) Regionalists.<sup>13</sup>

**1. Nationalist (Non Interventionists).**<sup>14</sup> They believe in: (1) focusing on national perspectives, (2) narrowing international interests, (3) limiting international commitments, liability, and foreign aid, and (3) becoming hawkish – if the U.S. is insulted or attacked. They are further subdivided into traditional liberals and traditional conservatives.<sup>15</sup>

**A. Traditional Liberals.** Their chief concerns are: (1) advancing the American domestic economy, (2) promoting social reform, (3) focusing national efforts on promoting and protecting the U.S. economy, (4) avoiding foreign interventions, and (5) avoiding imperialistic agendas.<sup>16</sup>

**B. Traditional Conservatives.** Their major issues are: (1) protecting and promoting America's security through national unity, (2) avoiding intervention, and (3) avoiding empire building temptations.<sup>17</sup>

**2. Internationalist (Interventionists) (Liberal Internationalist)** They advocate: (1) focusing on global perspectives, (2) broad international interests, (3) strong liberal world order - open markets and promote democracy overseas, (4) multilateralism, cooperative security, strong international institutions, (5) increased liability and commitments, (6) increased cost which is tolerable, and (7) use of force to intervene for democracy and humanitarian reasons.<sup>18</sup> Internationalists are further subdivided into neo liberals and neo conservatives.<sup>19</sup>

**A. Neo Liberals (Progressives).** They believe in advancing America's role in global leadership by: (1) building a strong liberal world order; leading the world "in a grand project of globalization," (2) limiting liability and commitments, (3) avoiding intervention; are skeptical of the use of force (4) using diplomacy, (5) building strong international institutions, and (6) are very reluctant to associate with undemocratic regimes.<sup>20</sup>

**B. Neo Conservatives.** They advocate advancing America's role in global security, and making America "the leader in a grand project to eliminate military or terrorist and military threats" to U.S. security.<sup>21</sup>

**3. Realists.** They believe in: (1) pragmatism; weak liberalism, (2) limited liability and commitments, (3) balanced and legitimate national interests, (4) skeptical of promoting democracy overseas, (5) open markets, (6) use of force and intervention for strategic


goals.<sup>22</sup> Realists are further subdivided into two camps - Defensive Realists and Offensive Realists.<sup>23</sup>

**A..Defensive Realists:**<sup>24</sup> They contend that nations should seek grand strategies that maximize security, not power. The true advantage favors defensive strategy and offensive strategy leads to greater insecurity. Great powers should avoid expansionist and hegemony intentions, but seek mutual defensive security. Cooperation is the foundation of power. They favor grand strategies promoting a “concert of power” like collective security, balance of power, and off shore balancing.

**B..Offensive Realists:**<sup>25</sup> They advocate that international security, among nations, is very scarce. To achieve true security, states must pursue expansionist policies to maximize their power and influence at expense of their rivals. Expansionism increases a nation’s security and survival by being the most powerful state. Power is the foundation of security. Realists favor grand strategies promoting primary.

**4. Regionalists:**<sup>26</sup> They believe that grand strategy is a “pure myth” because today’s global dynamics are too complex for any one grand strategy to work. Regionalists contend that grand strategy is undesirable, unattainable, overly ambitious, and even counter productive if it requires a centralization of global political power. They see global institutions like the United Nations as being too large to effectively deal with the world’s issues. Instead, regionalists advocate developing a series of smaller, narrow focused, strategies at regional rather than global level. Rather than pursuing grand strategy, they would recommend smaller regional security strategies promoting a concert of power sharing and establishing new regional security institutions.

## IMPETUS FOR GRAND STRATEGY CHANGE



**Figure 17. Impetus for Grand Strategy Change<sup>27</sup>**

### What Are The Forces Influencing Grand Strategy?

How does one strategic subculture group to “win out” over others in advocating their own grand strategy? How strategic groups rise to power is dependent on four situational factors (**Figure 17**): (1) international conditions at the time, (2) the dominant strategic culture in power, (3) the play of domestic politics, and (4) the right political leadership.<sup>28</sup>

Why does one grand strategy win out over its alternates? There are four conditions for a winning grand strategy as (**Figure 17**): (1) The Right Movement – has a strong social-political wave to push it to the front for consideration – like a new Presidential election or a 9-11 shock event, (2) Logic and Feasibility – shows great promise for working internationally, (3) Support - has strong political backing, influential advocates including the President, and (4) Appeal - possesses strong cultural appeal; linked closely to national values, and resonates with the public.<sup>29</sup>

## PROCESS FOR CHANGING GRAND STRATEGY




Figure 18. Process for Changing Grand Strategy<sup>30</sup>

**What Causes Grand Strategy To Change?** Colin Dueck identifies **six** phases to grand strategy change and development (Figure 18):<sup>31</sup>

- 1. Failure Phase.** Current grand strategy “fails” due to significant domestic events (i.e. Presidential election) or drastic international events (i.e. a shock, series of shocks, or significant threat or power changes) which become the impetus for change.
- 2. Opportunity Phase.** Failure (uncertainty) presents an opportunity for alternate strategic ideas to be considered. The government actively solicits strategic input.
- 3. Presentation Phase.** Leading national officials are presented with new strategic ideas. In turn, they are presented to the President who presents them for initial public

and legislative consideration. The National Security Council (NSC) officials narrow down strategic options for proper consideration.

**4. Debate Phase.** Strategic alternatives are reviewed, compared, discussed, and debated. Political camps form around favored feasible strategic concepts which are advocated over others, and then the President weighs in.

**5. Final Presentation Phase. (Figure 18)** Leaders ensure that the final strategic ideas presented to the public consideration are acceptable to nation's strategic culture.

**6. Adoption Phase.** The nation adopts and implements its new grand strategy.

**How Adequate is Our Grand Strategy Decision Making Process?** James C. Gaston asserts that our government system is a "flawed and imperfect" for several reasons:

- (1) The National Security Council (NCS) possesses a sole monopoly on grand strategy development which limits strategic input and options to the government.
- (2) Grand strategy development is reduced to "an additional duty" while its members find themselves competing with other daily governmental and departmental issues.
- (3) The process encourages institutional bias which limits strategic views are available for review or are expressed.<sup>32</sup>

Carnes Lord, National Defense University, recommends creating a "National Council on Grand Strategy."<sup>33</sup> This opens the field to greater input by drawing on wider base of national expertise. The ultimate goal should be to ensure that the President is presented with a genuine range of strategic options to decide on future grand strategy.<sup>34</sup>

## APPROACHES TO STRATEGY

Grand Strategy	Calculated	Free Floating	Hap Hazard
<b>Approach</b>	Seeks to effect profound changes now approach	Uses wait and see approach; awaits rise of major threats	Uses Trial and Error approach
<b>Focus</b>	Current Investment	Future Investment Only	Chance
<b>Risk</b>	Seeks to reduce risk	Grand strategy is not needed to reduce risk	Assumes greater risk
<b>Value</b>	Is highly valued and required; an active master plan is needed	Not highly valued; it is better to solve each international crisis as it arises without pursuing a master plan until a major threat appears on the horizon	Political uncertainty over what will work
<b>Application</b>	Carefully applied; highly analytical and measured; well thought out; worthy investment	Application of time and effort is not required now; planning efforts are suspended until needed	Hastily applied; lacks serious in depth analytical thought and effort

**Table 1. Grand Strategy Types<sup>35</sup>**

**Are There Different Types or Styles of Grand Strategy?** Strategists identify **three** styles or approaches to grand strategy - calculated, free floating, and hap hazard.<sup>36</sup>

**1. Calculated:**<sup>37</sup> (**Table 1**) Nations require an active grand strategy; seeks to reduce risk; is it is a highly analytical (well thought out), measured, and applied master plan. Grand strategy is considered a worthy investment and is highly valued. A good example is British Grand Strategy of the 18th and 19th Centuries (see **Chapter III**).

**2. Free Floating:**<sup>38</sup> (**Table 1**) States do not see grand strategy as vital or essential until grand threats arise. The nation adopts a “wait and see” approach until threats are more fully developed. Some theorists question whether many states even have any highly developed grand strategy. National strategic choices and decisions (whether or not tied to a coherent master plan) become their “free floating” grand strategy. A good example would be American Grand Strategy during the 1990s.<sup>39</sup>

3. **Hap Hazard:**<sup>40</sup> (Table 1) Countries use a trial and error approach to grand strategy.

There is much political uncertainty over what strategy will work. States assume great risk by picking a grand strategy and hastily applying it under pressure (without investing in serious analytical thought on serious long term costs and consequences). A good example would be Saddam Hussein's grand strategy.<sup>41</sup>




Figure 19. Grand Strategy Themes<sup>42</sup>

**Dominant Grand Strategy Themes - Empire and World Community.** There two master themes of grand strategy - empire and world community (Figure 19) which represent the “yin and yang” opposites of grand strategy.<sup>43</sup> These two dominant strategy themes pull in the direction of a greater centralized collection of power (unilateral) or towards a direction of greater cooperative efforts (multilateral). Between these two major themes is a wide spectrum of grand strategies ranging from power to cooperation (which is discussed in **Chapter VI**).

EMPIRE		EARTH COMMUNITY	
Primacy		Cooperative Security	
Domination and aggression		Cooperation and partnership	
Security through strength and power		Security through community alliance	
Military force for domination & control		Security forces for peacekeeping	
Centralized power		Decentralized power	
Life is hostile and competitive		Life is supportive and cooperative	
Humans are flawed and dangerous		Humans have many possibilities	
Order by dominating hierarchy		Order by partnership & cooperation	
Compete or die		Cooperate and live	
Love of power and status		Love of life	
Compliance by force or coercion		Compliance by persuasion and reason	
Defend the rights of self		Defend the rights of all	
Accumulation of wealth		Mutual prosperity	
See nations with potential chaos & instability		See nations with potential futures to contribute to the whole	
Consuming & Expensive		Sharing & Economy	
Conformity and standardization		Diversity and prolific	

**Table 2. Empire and World Community**<sup>44</sup>

**Table 2** presents an illustrated comparison of these two dominant grand strategy themes in philosophical principles and qualities.<sup>45</sup>

**The Essence of Empire:**<sup>45</sup> (1) works best in a unipolar or bipolar world, (2) seeks the acquisition of global power, influence, wealth, and centralized control over resources, (2) believes it is elite; is highly consuming and requires large global supply of goods and services, (3) requires a large military to protect its interests, (4) sees power, strength, and expansion as true security, (5) sees the world as chaotic, full of snakes, and the job of the empire to “tame the jungle” and restore the global PAX (imperial peace), (6) maintains world stability through diplomacy, force, or coercion, (7) can disregard international legitimacy to advance its own national interests. Empire grand strategy is discussed more fully in **Chapter V** and power and control grand strategies in **Chapter VI**. Theorists and historians contend that there are conceptual differences in ancient and modern (neo) empires, and **Table 3** provides a comparison. Both empire

versions advocate aggressive, influential, and expansive grand strategies. Some critics argue that grand strategies promoting empire building create international conflict and instability.

#### GRAND STRATEGY EMPIRE COMPARISON

ANCIENT EMPIRE	MODERN (NEO) EMPIRE
Seeks conquest of territory, expansion of borders, and control resources	Seeks dominating political and military influence to access resources
Domination of nations	Shaping of global political affairs
Rulership	Leadership
Colonies around the world	Military Bases around the world
Borders defined geographic boundaries	Borders defined by sphere of influence
Expansion by possessing physical territory	Expansion through global political and economic interests
Collects tribute or taxes from colonies	Accumulates wealth via global business
Counters enemy capabilities	Achieves technological dominance
Fleets and Armies	Fleets, Armies, Air, and Space Power
Military movement via land or sea	Global power projection
Cultural tolerance and pluralism	Global influential culture
Intervention for Conquest and Control	Intervention for Security and Stability
Large conventional arsenals	Large WMD arsenals
Threats of conventional destruction	Threats of nuclear destruction

**Table 3. Ancient and Modern Empire Comparison<sup>47</sup>**

**The Essence of World Community:**<sup>48</sup> (1) is the direct opposite of empire, (2) seeks to create a more harmonizing world, (3) security and progress is achieved through partnership and mutual cooperation, (4) sees a world full of possibilities and opportunities, and (5) uses a multi-lateral approach to build a joint future. Some critics argue that this idealistic strategy creates power conflicts which lead to chaos and instability. Who leads? Who follows? Who keeps the world order? Critics contend that true security is best achieved through grand strategies promoting a unipolar or bipolar world. The grand strategy of cooperative security is discussed in **Chapter VI**.


### CHAPTER III WHAT IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF A PAST GRAND STRATEGY?

Whosoever commands the seas commands trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.<sup>1</sup>

Sir Walter Raleigh

**The Grand Strategy Of The British Empire.** This project examines the grand strategy of the British Empire as a good working model. Since the British share a similar cultural, language, and strategic past with America, their example is useful for comparison.<sup>2</sup> How did the British ultimately build a world empire where “the sun never sets?” Through the Eighteen and Nineteen centuries (1700-1914), Britain grew from a small island nation with a small continental army into a vast and mighty world empire.<sup>3</sup> This feat was possible because the English possessed leaders with the vision, aspiration, and ambition, who skillfully used grand strategy to direct national efforts to achieve greater purposes. Grand strategy was a beacon (see **Chapter I, Table 1**).

Christopher Layne contributes that geography played a major role in the development of British and American grand strategy.<sup>4</sup> Nations possessing maritime or geographic separation gain a considerable strategic advantage over states who must share borders with rivals.<sup>5</sup> Britain benefited from having the English Channel as a “stand off” from its European rivals.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, America’s two oceans serve as a strategic buffer keeping foreign powers at bay.<sup>7</sup> Maritime geography reduced strategic vulnerability for Britain and America to foreign invasion allowing both to develop strong economies rather than squander their national resources in fighting invading armies.<sup>8</sup> While Europe became weaker through its constant conflict, Britain grew stronger and more prosperous via the fruits of its grand strategy.




**Figure 20. British Empire Map.<sup>8</sup>**

The British initially built their empire through a combination of exploration, conquest, and trade actions.<sup>10</sup> At their empire's zenith, the British controlled about 13 million square miles of territory (Figure 20), about 23% of the earth's surface, and ruled almost 25% of the world's humanity.<sup>11</sup> They sustained their empire through the perception of British culture superiority and legitimacy.<sup>12</sup> The British were masters of exploiting "soft power" strategically which permitted their use of small military occupational forces.<sup>13</sup>

By generating great wealth through developing colonies, strong financial institutions, and vibrant world markets, the British became "the world's banker."<sup>14</sup> The center piece of their grand strategy was dominating foreign trade by keeping competitors from establishing trading centers in the northern hemisphere, and using its industrial might to under sell others.<sup>15</sup> The British key to successful trade was "controlling the seas" with a maritime strategy of naval supremacy using naval patrols

and placing military bases at strategic world choke points.<sup>16</sup> Ultimately, British maritime strategy was so successful at allowing peace, commerce, and world stability to flourish on the seas that it became known as “PAX Britannica.”<sup>17</sup>



**Figure 21. British Grand Strategy**<sup>18</sup>

**Figure 21** provides an illustrated model of British Grand Strategy. Two major underpinnings of British grand strategy which permitted their empire to go largely unchallenged were initiating policies of “cultural tolerance and pluralism” – the basic cohesive elements of great world empires.<sup>19</sup> These policies capitalized on the skill sets and motivated acceptance of rule from its large, diverse, and geographically dispersed population.<sup>20</sup> This allowed the British to control millions of royal subjects with only a few thousand troops and civil servants.<sup>21</sup> Whenever trouble erupted in remote corners of their empire, the British rapidly deployed their royal navy and army to restore regional stability. This winning grand strategy of cultural assertiveness, sound policies, and

military superiority (hard and soft power) permitted the British to maintain central empire control over vast geographical distances.<sup>22</sup>

**The Grand Strategy of Offshore Balancing.** The British sustained their empire through a grand strategy of “Off Shore Balancing” (see **Figure 20**).<sup>23</sup> In other words, a state uses its political, economic, and military influence to “balance” the power of other overseas nations to its advantage by “lending support” (strengthen nations) or “withdrawing its support” (weaken nations) as the situation changes. A nation could shift alliances, coalitions, trade, and allies as needed to maintain an overseas balance of power. The grand strategy of off shore balancing provided the British a number of advantages by: (1) using its maritime geography to avoid frequent entanglement in Europe’s disputes and wars, (2) encouraging a balance of power in Europe, (3) developing multi-lateral grand alliances and seeking allies, (4) investing in a large navy to protect its maritime commerce, secure its lanes, guard its shores, or use naval blockades, (5) using its economic influence to underwrite coalitions against competing rivals, (6) permitting Britain to be a “by stander” at the start of major conflicts allowing its allies to defend themselves.<sup>24</sup> This strategy provided the British with options to stay out of the fight (if its allies were winning), or join in (if its allies were losing badly) as in the case of helping Europe remove Napoleon from power.<sup>25</sup>

British historian B.H. Liddell Hart identifies **five** major “winning” factors of British grand strategy success: (1) it was economical in cost, (2) it was carefully calculated, (3) it was moderate, (4) it was constantly assessing its ways and means, and (5) it produced economic prosperity.<sup>26</sup> Some strategists advocate that America should seek a future grand strategy of Off Shore Balancing.

## CHAPTER IV. WHY DO WE NEED A NEW GRAND STRATEGY?

The crisis often demonstrates that the old strategy has failed.<sup>1</sup>  
John Lewis Gaddis

In the old days, our nation built light houses at strategic locations to light the way in dark or stormy nights to passing ships to avoid dangerous conditions. A beacon would illuminate the area as both a warning and as a course correction aide. Sea faring captains and the crews depended on lighthouses to avoid many a ship wreck. Time, technology, and changing conditions have ended the era of the light houses like the end of the cold war has ended our last grand strategy – containment.

**What Is Our Current Grand Strategy?** After the cold war, there was little national motivation for pursuing a grand strategy.<sup>2</sup> America faced no major threats and domestic interest in international affairs became a low priority.<sup>3</sup> Strategist Thomas Barnett asserts that America adopted a “wait and see strategy” – that it was better to wait for a future long term “grand enemy” rather than squander resources on a near term “messy world.”<sup>4</sup> America’s grand strategy “was to avoid grand strategies.”<sup>5</sup> General Bruce K. Holloway (ret) described America’s attitude towards grand strategy during that era as “we are poker players who play each hand as it comes, usually without any long term strategy. We tackle each problem singly and head on, expecting to solve it immediately.”<sup>6</sup>

The historical 9/11 surprise attack on the American homeland was the impetus giving birth to a new American grand strategy.<sup>7</sup> “After a decade of drift,” John Ikenberry emphasizes that America had “finally rediscovered its grand strategic purpose.”<sup>8</sup> On September 20, 2001 and in his state of the Union Address in 2002, President George W. Bush announced his bold grand strategy (Bush Doctrine) for taking the fight to the

enemy, pursuing a global war of terrorism, against the “axis of evil,” and pursuing a crusade “against evil itself.”<sup>9</sup>

America had adopted a radical new grand strategy departing from all historical and traditional strategies of its past.<sup>10</sup> No longer would America be content by merely “being competitive” but this new grand vision saw the nation “beating the competition” through dominant military strength and “preventing competition.”<sup>11</sup> Analyst James Mann observed that America had set on a new strategic grand course:

...adopting a far reaching set of ideas and policies to change the world and America's role in it...A new vision for a world to be dominated by a sole America superpower...working to make sure no rival or group of rivals would ever emerge...America need not and should not reach accommodations with any other country. Now, however, the U.S. was not combating a single known rival, such as the Soviet Union or China. Rather America was making sure that no adversary with whom anyone could suggest for détente would ever emerge. The vision was breathtaking.<sup>12</sup>

**Why Did The Bush Doctrine Win Out Over Its Alternatives?** Bush's new grand strategy of primacy “united” Americans against a common foe (identifying the major threat) and provided a common purpose (linkage to American values and principles). The Bush Doctrine tied the ends (make the world safe for democracy), ways (methodology – a multi-lateral or unilateral global war on terrorism), and means (resources –hard power). This new strategy passed the **four conditions** for a new grand strategy to win over its alternatives:

- 1. The Right Movement.** The timing was right. A major event had occurred (the 9-11 attack, a 21st Century Pearl Harbor incident) and Americans wanted action.
- 2. Feasible.** This strategy seemed like a very reasonable course of action to fight terrorism on a global scale to safeguard America and its allies.

**3. Support.** Upon its presentation, this new grand strategy appealed to the patriotic sentiment of the American public and political elite without serious national debate on possible alternative grand strategies.<sup>13</sup>

**4. Cultural appeal.** – The strategy applied a direct linkage to the 9-11 event. This resonated a crusade for action among Americans to “unite behind a great cause and demonstrate our solidarity and resolve in the face of adversity.”<sup>14</sup>




Figure 22. The Bush Doctrine<sup>15</sup>

**What Was The Core Essence Of The Bush Doctrine?** On September 17, 2002, President Bush put his new grand strategy in print via the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) outlining four major U.S. tenants (Figure 22): (1) **Preemption**: taking swift, decisive, preventive, and preemptive military action against hostile states and terrorists groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (2) **Military Challenge**: not allowing its global military strength to be challenged by

hostile adversaries. (3) **Multilateralism or Unilateralism**: committed to multilateral cooperation, but would act alone, if necessary to defend its national interests.

(4) **Democracy**: spread democratic principles and values globally.<sup>16</sup>

**What Are The Major Issues With The Bush Doctrine?** Strategists and theorists counter that our current grand strategy has serious flaws. The Bush Doctrine does not meet the criteria and definition of a true grand strategy concept.<sup>17</sup> Gary Hart, former U.S. Senator, contends that America has no real grand strategy; that the Bush Doctrine has no coherent framework for applying our national powers to achieve larger national purposes (see **Chapter I** ).<sup>18</sup>

Christopher Mead suggests that the Bush Doctrine “deprived victory of much value” due to America’s unsuccessful efforts to: (1) convince global opinion to share its assessment to world danger, (2) motivate the world to share jointly in financing the war in terrorism, and (3) reduce fear that we may have damaged Cold War alliances.<sup>19</sup>

John Lewis Gaddis contends that the “most obvious failure” of the Bush Doctrine “was the relationship between preemption, hegemony, and consent.”<sup>20</sup> This strategy “rattled and unsettled allies” by projecting American hegemony behavior that looked “unstrained” causing “shock and awe” among world opinion.<sup>21</sup>

John Ikenberry adds that the world could perceive the Bush Doctrine as advocating: (1) an American unipolar world, (2) a new American analysis of global threats and how they must be attacked via the American way, (3) that the Cold War concept of deterrence is outdated, (4) a refining of sovereignty, and (5) depreciating international rules, treaties, and security partnerships.<sup>22</sup> This project conducts a

comparative and contrasting analysis of the Bush Doctrine in **Chapter VI**, and my personal analysis is covered in **Chapter VII**.

**What Are The Barriers To Grand Strategy Development?** Scholars and leaders ponder if America is truly capable of developing a wise and effective grand strategy. There lies our grand strategy dilemma – a clear lack of national consensus. Our political system is decentralized and fragmented due to the mechanics of organization, institutionalism, institutional memory, electoral process, and bureaucratic gamesmanship.<sup>23</sup> Political subcultures advocate their own unique perspectives and prescriptions for grand strategy which produces **three** major barriers.<sup>24</sup>

**1. We are divided on our national purposes, goals, and interests.** The first step in developing a grand strategy is to determine the nation's interests, but Americans are divided as to what they should be (as discussed in Chapter I).<sup>25</sup> Peter Trubowitz's book "Defining the National Interest" contends that grand strategy's dilemma is America's inability to determine its changing national interests due to: (a) intense differences in political ideology, values, principles – over national identity and role, (b) institutional bias in government organizations, (c) a debate over whether national interest should be narrow versus broad, (d) a conflict of regional versus national interests, and (e) a fragmented political system that does not promote political unity.<sup>26</sup> Case in point, the President is held accountable for advancing national interests while congress is accountable for regional interests.<sup>27</sup>

How much risk and cost should America assume to assure its security and economic prosperity? Should we continue to protect access to foreign oil supplies or

pursue a vigorous national energy policy? Should we rebuild the world in our own image (transforming failed states through nation building into new democratic nations)?

**2. We are divided on the threat.** The second step in developing a grand strategy is to identify the threats to our national interests, but Americans disagree on the true nature of the threat.<sup>28</sup> Is the threat: (a) traditional or non traditional? (b) frequent U.S. intervention or the lack there of? (c) external or internal? or (d) military or economic?<sup>29</sup>

**3. We are divided on who we are (identity) and what we should do (role).** The third step in developing a grand strategy is to decide how to best to employ the instruments of national power to protect our interests, but Americans differ on our national identity and world role.<sup>30</sup> Should America's world role be a global leader, global cop, global peace maker, global facilitator, or should we mind our own business?<sup>31</sup> Is America a superpower, hyperpower, hegemony, empire, or republic? Behind these names and labels are strategic implications. This project will review **four** major concepts:

**A. America is a Hyperpower.** In 1998, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, defined America as a "hyperpower," a term that best describes a nation state that is clearly "dominant or predominant in all categories."<sup>32</sup> The French see the term "Superpower," as an outdated old Cold War term that reflects old "military capabilities" between America and the Soviet Union.<sup>33</sup> Vedrine remarks that "American strength is unique, extending beyond economics, technology or military might to this domination of attitudes, concepts, language and modes of life."<sup>34</sup> What are the strategic implications by this label? Should not America develop a new grand strategy that can capitalize on these unique advantages to advance its interests?

**B. America is an Empire.** There are both idealist and realist versions of empire.

**(1). Idealist Version.** Advocates contend that empire is not about the “process” of expanding borders, territories seeking new colonies, claiming new territory, or dominating the world (see **Chapter II, Table 3**).<sup>35</sup> Today globalization makes the concept of empire “borderless.”<sup>36</sup> Empire is about global leadership and influence, not rulership.<sup>37</sup> Jefferson proclaimed that America was “an empire of liberty,”<sup>38</sup> while Reagan echoed “we are an empire of ideals.”<sup>39</sup> Empire is America’s great historical calling for a “global manifest destiny,” shaping history, and making life better for mankind by promoting America values globally and advancing a liberal world order.<sup>40</sup>

**(2). Realist Version.** John Lewis Gaddis defines empire as “shaping the behavior of other states through the outright use of force through intimidation, dependence, and even inspiration (see **Chapter I, Table 2 and Table 3**).”<sup>41</sup> The concept of empire can be viewed as negative or positive:


**(a) Empire is Negative.** Empire is seen as causing world instability.<sup>42</sup> This strategy is seen as a means of providing hegemony dominance to invade nations, remove regimes, and shape the world in its image.<sup>43</sup> Critics call this America’s “imperial project” and is the basis for “POX Americana.”<sup>44</sup> Joseph Gerson’s book “The Empire and the Bomb” suggests that the U.S. has used nuclear weapons to bolster its imperial ambitions and preserve its global empire.<sup>45</sup> International critics have called the U.S. a rogue nation or global bully “picking fights with third world nations like Iraq” and threatening nuclear war in order to maintain its elite global status.<sup>46</sup>

**(b) Empire is Positive.** Empire is seen as providing “benevolent influence”<sup>47</sup> as opposed to its dark alternatives by providing global security, stability, and

prosperity.<sup>48</sup> Without American hegemony, the chaotic world would soon return to the “dark ages.”<sup>49</sup> In other words, the U.S. is the world’s best hope via PAX Americana.

**(1) Is America Rome?** Harvard Historian, Niall Ferguson, states that “America has always been an empire in denial.”<sup>50</sup> Cullen Murphy’s book “Are we Rome?” sees striking similarities between America and the Roman Empire: (1) our national seal, an eagle, mirrors Rome’s conquest standards, (2) Washington is Rome, Congress is our senate, and our military legions advance imperial interests, (3) the President is protected by the secret service, the Praetorian Guard, (4) Combatant Command Commanders are Proconsuls advancing our regional interests, (5) national sports and electronics are our “bread and circuses,” (6) illegal immigrants and transnational terrorists are the “barbarians at the gates, and (7) America’s coliseum is the “world stage.”<sup>51</sup> Expansionists would recommend a grand strategy of primacy. Others disagree by contending that America most resembles the British Empire by providing global security and stability in which the world enjoys the benefits.<sup>52</sup> The Roman Empire, on the other hand, provided conquest, domination, and slavery.

**(2) If America is an empire, what are its strategic implications for grand strategy?** Ian Roxborough identifies that “having” empire implies three burdensome strategic tasks: (1) defining and dealing with a principal enemy, (2) obligation to maintain a world order, and (3) suppressing resistance on the periphery.<sup>53</sup> Chalmers Johnson’s book “Sorrows of Empire” identifies four sorrows awaiting nations that follow imperialistic agendas: (1) a state of perpetual war, (2) loss of liberty, (3) truthfulness versus propaganda, and (4) eventual bankruptcy.<sup>54</sup> **Figure 23** illustrates the many variables involved in the fall of empires (including grand strategy failure).




**Figure 23. Why Empires Fall.**<sup>55</sup>

Critics like Thomas Barnett contend that the concept of “empire is myth” and is “an absence of strategy.”<sup>56</sup> He asserts that empire is a description of status and not a prescription for grand strategy.<sup>57</sup> Jack Snyder’s book “Myths of Empire” asserts that empire is a result of an overly aggressive national ambition, exaggerated benefits, and underrated costs.<sup>58</sup> Ultimately, empires collapse due to over expansion, imperial overstretch, rising costs, and provoking opposing coalitions (**Figure 23**).<sup>59</sup>

**C. America is a Republic.** Nationalists contend that America is a nation of principles, and its heart and soul is that of a “republic.”<sup>60</sup> “America doesn’t do empire, America does leadership.”<sup>61</sup> The U.S. should reframe from any aspirations of expansionism or empire building, and return to its humble basic roots.<sup>62</sup> Republic advocates recommend grand strategies like isolationism or liberal internationalism.

**D. America is a Hegemony.** In ancient times, the Greek term hegemony referred to “temporary dominance of one group over another,” like Athens or Sparta over neighboring Greek states.<sup>63</sup> Today’s definition has a new contemporary commercial twist. Michael Hardt calls this concept “capitalism as sovereignty.”<sup>64</sup> John Agnew asserts that the hegemony concept is all about America’s global leadership role in: (1) advancing globalization, (2) global power economics, and (3) building a strong liberal economic world order through free markets and trade.<sup>65</sup> Hegemony advocates recommend grand strategies that promote liberal internationalism.

On the other hand, international critics insist that the term hegemony is an “over exaggeration” of America’s true status and role in the world.<sup>66</sup> They see an America in decline and would recommend that the U.S. pursue a new grand strategy to recover legitimacy like cooperative security.<sup>67</sup>



**Figure 24. Grand Strategy Disillusion Syndrome.**<sup>68</sup>

**Domestic Support.** Public opinion could also be considered a major potential barrier (**Figure 24**). America's international commitments must not exceed its citizens willingness (the national will) to accept the costs of its grand strategy.<sup>69</sup> Historically, Americans have a strong strategic cultural preference for "limited liability."<sup>70</sup> The public's limited tolerance level grows more skeptical and frustrated when causalities and costs increase due to long term military interventions (protracted conflicts) that are perceived as failing and producing a "disillusion syndrome" (**Figure 23**).<sup>71</sup> Hence, achieving success and victory is vital to sustaining public confidence.<sup>72</sup> Otherwise, Strategist Colin Dueck emphasizes that when failure is perceived, the "American political system tends to pull grand strategy back in the direction of limited liability."<sup>73</sup> Analysis shows that the public supports interventions that resist aggressors and protect vital nation interests rather than pursuing nation building endeavors.<sup>74</sup>


**What Are The Constraints To Grand Strategy?** The U.S. possesses **four** major constraints on its power and grand strategy:

**1. Debt.** Historian Niall Ferguson calls this the "clay feet of the colossus."<sup>75</sup> Since 2001, the U.S. has spent well over 500 billion on the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and could reach 1.7 trillion by 2017.<sup>76</sup> America borrows from foreign lenders to finance its public debt and commitments.<sup>77</sup> The U.S. has a national deficit is greater than \$9.1 trillion dollars,<sup>78</sup> and a trade deficit of over \$588 billion in 2007.<sup>79</sup>

**2. Energy.** With the world's largest economy, America has a massive appetite for huge quantities of cheap energy and a heavy dependence on foreign oil.<sup>80</sup> The United States consumes 80 million barrels of oil daily and 25% of the world's energy with only 5% of the world's population.<sup>81</sup> Rising nations like China and India are transforming to

more energy consuming lifestyles and competing with America.<sup>82</sup> Advocates urge seeking energy independence strategy to rid America's reliance on foreign energy.<sup>83</sup>

**3. Free Riders.** To illustrate this concept, in January 2007, the British Defense Ministers announced its plans to reduce its royal naval fleet by fifty percent.<sup>84</sup> A British admiral confided, "Why should Britain maintain an expensive navy when the U.S. Navy is so strong?"<sup>85</sup> In exchange for acting alone as a hegemonic power, the U.S. increases its military spending, while the world scales back and "free rides" on the security benefits of PAX Americana.<sup>86</sup> By pursuing a grand strategy with a "monopoly on hegemony,"<sup>87</sup> America spends more on its military power than the entire world collectively.<sup>88</sup> To illustrate this point, **Figure 25** compares U.S. military expenditures with those of the other leading nations of the world.



**Figure 25. World Military Expenditures.**<sup>89</sup>


**4. Overextension.** America's grand strategy has become a Quad IV strategy (see **Figure 5**) by overextending its political will and constrained capability (military might) by committing its "relatively small volunteer army" in military interventions in Afghanistan

and Iraq.<sup>90</sup> On September 26, 2007, the Army's Chief of Staff, General George Casey, told the House Armed Services Committee that the Army has been stretched so thin by the war in Iraq that it can not adequately respond to another conflict.<sup>91</sup>

The Army is "out of balance" and "the current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies."<sup>92</sup>

Adding to the military stress, Air Force officials warned the nation on February 19, 2008, that it needed 100 billion dollars more (20 billion per year for the next five years) to maintain America's air power that "unless their budget is increased dramatically, and soon, the military's high flying branch won't dominate the skies as it has for decades."<sup>93</sup>

The total number of America's deployments (393,569 troops) in supporting its world wide commitments as illustrated in **Figure 26**.<sup>94</sup> The U.S. accounts for 73% of all world militaries deployed globally.<sup>95</sup>



**Figure 26. World Wide U.S. Military Deployments.**<sup>96</sup>

In response, to the Army's request for more Soldiers, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to "expand the Army from a total of 1,037,000 active and reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2013 – an increase of 74,200 military personnel – in order to meet the increasing strategic demands and help reduce stress on the force."<sup>97</sup> Will history show this to be a large enough force? America's current grand strategy also requires a vast global infrastructure to maintain a large forward presence. The U.S. has forces stationed in about 150 countries (out of 192 countries).<sup>98</sup> In supporting these troops, the Pentagon calculates that it owns or rents about 823 overseas military bases (not including its 6000 bases in the United States).<sup>99</sup> To remain highly responsive and flexible to conflicts, the U.S. anticipates redeploying some troops to the homeland, reducing some overseas bases while adding new temporary bases, and restructuring its strategic posture.<sup>100</sup>

America will need future strategic initiatives to enhance its future global power projection, as well as its health, and wealth. Can a new grand strategy make a difference? A great nation needs a grand strategy that will promote its higher purposes, define its role in the world, and guide its future destiny. Fighting terrorism is not enough. Like a ship upon the sea, America needs a new grand strategy that will put strong wind in our sails to promote our national interests, security, economic prosperity, and our principles. The events of 9-11 drew America together by uniting its citizens in purpose and resolve. The next grand strategy must also have that same resonating effect. Grand strategy is like a light house with a beacon to help the nation avoid ship wreck in international waters in the misty of rocky dangers. America can simply not afford to be without the best grand strategy possible. It is that important.

## CHAPTER V. WHAT IS THE FUTURE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE?

The real threat is the unknown, the uncertain. In a very real sense, the primacy threat to our security is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one expected or predicted.<sup>1</sup>

GEN Collin Powell

Grand strategy must be understood in the “context” of its future application.

Daniel Drezner believes that George F. Kennan (founder of America’s containment grand strategy) had it easy - essentially one enemy, one threat, one grand strategy.<sup>2</sup> Today’s strategic environment is multi-complex, multi-threat, multi-paradigm, and multi-dimensional.<sup>3</sup>




Figure 27. American Global Supremacy Map<sup>4</sup>

**What Are The U.S. Strategic Advantages?** Figure 27 illustrates America’s dominate global status. The United States possesses a number of strategic advantages. Edward Olsen lists these as: (1) it is geo-strategically secure (2) possesses global power projection capabilities – to export security, (3) the absence of a peer military rival


or other superpower rivals, (4) superior military forces, (5) large nuclear arsenal, (6) cutting edge technology, (7) ocean barriers on West and East flanks, (8) stable and friendly nations on its borders, (9) large industrial base, productive economy and great wealth, (10) abundance of natural resources.<sup>5</sup>

Robert J. Art, Brandis University Professor, identifies additional U.S. advantages which include: (1) large pool of skilled citizens, (2) large industrial base, (3) availability of allies, (4) a balance of power in Europe and Asia, (5) maritime geography, and (6) time, bought by allies and separation, to prepare and convert from peace time economy and industrial strength to wartime capacity.<sup>6</sup>

Theorist Ralph Peters suggests that America's greatest advantage is its explosive soft power – a culture that inspires and harnesses imagination, intellect, and initiative which is “self reinforced by law, efficiency, openness, flexibility, market discipline, and social mobility.”<sup>7</sup>

**What Are the U.S. Strategic Disadvantages?** Harvard Professor, Michael Ignatieff, sees **four** major U.S. strategic disadvantages: (1) **“hubris”** – the ancient Romans called the concept asking the military to perform “more than it can do” as the preferred instrument of national power, (2) **geo-military gap** – America is alone without credible allies with comparable military and technological capabilities, (3) **nation building liability** - absorbing the cost of expensive nation building project in failed states (drain on national resources), and (4) **global security liability** - assuming most of the cost burden for maintaining PAX Americana (world security and stability).<sup>8</sup>

**What is the Strategic Environment?** Today's strategists must conduct an accurate assessment of the strategic environment that a new grand strategy must confront. America faces in the 21st century threats (**Figure 28**) ranging from non traditional asymmetrical to traditional symmetrical threats that are irregular, catastrophic, traditional, or disruptive.<sup>9</sup>



**Figure 28. The Security Environment Post 9-11**<sup>10</sup>

The greatest threat is free lance terrorism or hostile rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>11</sup> Stephen Walt's book "Taming America Power" reflects how nations have learned to indirectly manipulate and thwart U.S. primacy to their advantage.<sup>12</sup> Derek Smith's book "Deterring America" envisions more rogue states and non state actors trying to "out play us" in a "contest of wills and strategies" in finding new ways to exploit U.S. weaknesses.<sup>13</sup> **Table 4** lists these potential strategic threats.

Threat	Consensus View	Contrary View
<b>Homeland Vulnerability</b>	Improvements in national security measures since 9-11 have reduced U.S. vulnerability.	An open society can not entirely eliminate innovative or suicidal threats.
<b>WMD in Large Scale Combat or Conflicts</b>	Likelihood of WMD use during large scale combat or by terrorists or rogue states remains quite high.	WMD proliferation expected to continue into the future. An effective national missile defense could help.
<b>Global Competitors</b>	No global competitor envisioned before 2025 who can challenge the U.S. on military terms.	China could become a global competitor by 2025 or China, Russia, and/or India could form an Asian alliance.
<b>Regional Competitors</b>	One or more rogue states could challenge the U.S. in the future.	Astute relations with Russia, China, and India could help prevent hostilities.
<b>Economic Competitors</b>	Economic competition might not lead to direct military confrontation. Growth of free markets and new technologies will solve more problems than they cause.	Increased global prosperity may lead to increased global instability due to economic polarization. China could match Japan by 2016 or India could equal Germany by 2015.
<b>Failing States</b>	Increasing failing states with Africa and the Middle East being more vulnerable.	Increasing reluctance by most states to become involved in inventions of failing states.
<b>Nonstate Threats</b>	Non state actors will increase in number and intensity.	Continuation of terrorism seeking WMD capability.
<b>Control of the Global Seas, Air, and Outer Space</b>	It might take competitors 10 years to match numbers and sophistication of U.S. Naval and USAF Air Fleets. However, China and India are quickly building large and modern "blue water navies." India is building more aircraft carriers. Treaties may prevent weapon proliferation in outer space.	Availability of high tech weapons used in asymmetric conflicts could provide opponents with leverage. Disregard for treaties could result in outer space weapon proliferation. China and India are developing advanced research programs for active involvement in outer space.
<b>Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies</b>	Anti-access strategy remains a historically proven means to make U.S. intervention costly and blunt power projection.	The U.S. is developing counter methods. China will possess the world's largest submarine fleet by 2010.
<b>Information Warfare</b>	Asymmetric attacks on the U.S. military and economic electronic infrastructure are likely.	Preventing asymmetrical electronic 9-11 events on U.S. internet/information systems is challenging.

**Table 4. Strategic Threat Scenario Assessment.<sup>14</sup>**


## STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

National Interests	Threats	Assessment
<b>Defense of the Homeland</b>	Grand Terrorism or Rogue States using WMD	Most Likely
<b>Peace and Stability Among Eurasia Powers</b>	Aggressive great powers and hegemonies	Not Present
<b>Secure access to oil and other global resources</b>	Rogue states could threaten America's global access	Present
<b>Economic Well Being (International economic openness)</b>	Great power security competition, regional wars, economic nationalism	Not Present
<b>Promotion of Values (Spread of Democracy and human rights)</b>	Ruthless leaders, civil war, thwarting of economic growth	Present
<b>Reducing severe climate change</b>	Unstrained carbon emissions	Present

**Table 5. Strategic Assessment.**<sup>15</sup>

**Table 5** presents a basic strategic assessment of U.S. national interests against major threats. **Figure 29** illustrates major challenging grand strategy scenarios.

### Grand Strategy Potential Challenging Scenarios



**Figure 29. Potential Challenging Scenarios.**<sup>16</sup>

## **What Kind Of Potential Scenarios Might Grand Strategy Confront?**

In the scheme of things, grand strategy must address future scenarios with new and unexpected rivals, threats, technology, and opposing strategies (see **Figure 29**).<sup>17</sup>

Will America face disastrous strategic surprise, be caught entirely off guard by new highly advanced technology, face unexpected competition, be overwhelmed by a new adversarial warfare capability, or face unimagined catastrophic events?

## **New Visions Of Strategic Chaos.**

America finds itself in need of an effective grand strategy as it sails upon very troubled waters. Samuel Huntington envisions future global patterns of conflict over intense ideological, religious, ethical, economic, and political divisions - a friction of opposing cultures.<sup>18</sup> Thomas Barnett sees rising international terrorism, WMD, non-state actors, rogue states, failing states, and nation building.<sup>19</sup> Robert Peters visualizes rising violence, asymmetrical conflicts, less classic conventional wars, explosive lawlessness, and assaults on moral order.<sup>20</sup> Today's media provides many examples of rising global tensions. In January 2007, China demonstrated its new ability to shoot down satellites.<sup>21</sup> Russia announced, in September 2007, it had tested the largest non-nuclear explosive device in the world.<sup>22</sup> The Army's Chief of Staff, General George Casey calls this future global phenomena of continuing conflict as "persistent warfare."<sup>23</sup>

## **New Paradigms Of World Disorder**

How stable will the international system be in the future? Some strategists see a "new age of insurgencies."<sup>24</sup> Richard Schultz, Fletcher School ISS Professor, stated the bi-polar world provided a stabilized world order, but "the end of the cold war opened the lid of identity crisis."<sup>25</sup> The advent of globalization and new technologies has given

rogue groups “abilities to project power” “not localized but through transitional dimensions.”<sup>26</sup> Tactical strikes can now have strategic implications. Prem Shankar’s book “The Twilight of the Nation State” sees increasing global instability with a cycle of more failed states due to the negative consequences of globalization.<sup>27</sup> There are 192 nation states and about 60 are in danger of failing (with a majority of those in Africa).<sup>28</sup>

### **New Age Of Nuclear Weaponry**

Some theorists contend that we have entered a “new age of nuclear weaponry.”<sup>29</sup> They believe that the likelihood of nuclear war is greater now than before the fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>30</sup> The doomsday nuclear clock stands at five minutes to midnight from world catastrophic destruction.<sup>31</sup> Paul Rogers contends that “prospects for controlling nuclear weapons” has “deteriorated” and there is no immediate sign of an improvement.<sup>32</sup> For example, on 20 January 2008, Russia’s military chief of staff boldly announced to the world that Moscow could potentially use nuclear weapons in preventive strikes to protect itself and its allies.<sup>33</sup>

Scientists are exploring new generations of low yield nuclear weaponry for tactical applications.<sup>34</sup> Some advocate stationing advanced nuclear weaponry into the last “demilitarized” frontier of space.<sup>35</sup> Scholars on Proliferation of WMD identify nine nations (U.S., Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) possessing well over 26,000 nuclear war heads in the world.<sup>36</sup>

Will the cold war concept of nuclear deterrence work with terrorists, non state actors, and rogue states? Will failing states with nuclear weapons possess the ability to keep them out of terrorist hands?

## **New Paradigms of Global Security**

Grand strategy development will be challenging in the 21st Century as more traditional roles, concepts, premises, and methodologies are challenged from tactical to strategic levels. General George Casey stated that traditional battlefield concepts are changing.<sup>37</sup> The military will have more challenging and demanding roles requiring more flexible, adaptive, and culturally astute leaders.<sup>38</sup> If many old rules no longer apply, nation states will have to reevaluate how they will deal effectively with this new changing strategic environment.<sup>39</sup>


Thomas Barnett suggests that since the old Cold War has ended, new global rules are needed concerning war and peace:<sup>40</sup> (1) well thought out and stable set of rules for global security will lead to greater stability if they are widely accepted by the world community, and (2) these accepted rules should set “the conditions under which it is reasonable to wage war against identified enemies.”

In the past, Western nation states have relied exclusively on “military forces, technology, and advanced weaponry” to maintain their elite “status quo” and their national security.<sup>41</sup> This may not work effectively in the later 21st century as “new security paradigms” will be needed to maintain global security and stability as the “nature of conflict changes.”<sup>42</sup> Professor Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew in their book “Terrorists, Insurgents, and Militias” offer that:

the way war has been waged has changed...war has not conformed to Western methods of combat. Indeed, even the groups involved and the tactics they use have changed...Armed groups – insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations – have found innovative ways to use force in unconventional and asymmetric ways...But policymakers and military commanders of modern states have often failed to grasp this new battlefield.<sup>43</sup>


## New Age Of Technology

How will rapidly changing 21st century technology impact and influence future grand strategy (**Figure 30**)? Will it produce more global security or more insecurity? Will it usher in enhanced possibilities for “strategic surprise” or becoming a “cross leveler” for competing forces?




**Figure 30. Technology Influence on Grand Strategy.**<sup>44</sup>

Will it shorten the tactical, operational, and strategic band width? Bill Martel, Fletcher School ISSP Professor, stated that “technology is changing the fabric of international security and politics. It is influencing and changing public debate in the fields of policy, political, economic, and military discourse.”<sup>45</sup> Rapidly changing technology and its accessibility on a greater global scale will have profound impact on shaping future world situational awareness, communications, and decision making.<sup>46</sup>



**Figure 31. Conflict Fault Lines.**<sup>47</sup>

**Where Will Future Conflict Occur?** Grand strategy must also consider the geography of future conflict (Figure 31). Thomas Barnett envisions a large “gap” of future global conflict.<sup>48</sup> Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Fletcher School ISS Professor, sees “potential international fault lines running from Southeastern Europe to through the Middle East, Southwestern Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan to India, China, Taiwan to Korea.”<sup>49</sup> He envisions another fault line “running from Southwestern Europe down through North Africa through Libya.”<sup>50</sup> Pfaltzgraff perceives potential crisis’ with: (1) Korea, (2) China and Taiwan, (3) India, Pakistan, and Kashmir, (4) Afghanistan, (5) Iran and Iraq, and (6) Israel and its neighbors.<sup>51</sup> Other “potential crisis areas include African failed states such as Kenya, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Rwanda.”<sup>52</sup>




**Figure 32. Grand Strategy Challenges**<sup>53</sup>

### Conflicts Over Global Resources

The world may see future resource conflicts, revolts from the margins, and environmental limits to global growth (Figure 32).<sup>54</sup> Michael T. Klare's book "Resource Wars: the New Landscape of Global Conflict" sees a rising impact of resource scarcity on the world's military policies.<sup>55</sup> The United Nations envisions growing fierce competition for oil, fresh water, and other limited resources as the global population increases daily by 250,000 people.<sup>56</sup> The world is running out of energy.<sup>57</sup> Future catastrophic natural disasters and climate change can disrupt food production and deplete global supplies.<sup>58</sup> A widening of the rich - poor gap will create more world unrest and instability (global economic polarization).<sup>59</sup> Limits to global growth include pollution, desertification, deforestation, fresh water shortages, and declining ecological


land capability to support human populations.<sup>60</sup> Future grand strategy must also include regional strategies to deal effectively with the complexities unique to those areas.<sup>61</sup>



**Figure 33. Struggling America.**<sup>62</sup>

**Two America Futures.** Theorists see two future Americas as a result of its grand strategy.<sup>63</sup> Some envision a struggling America restricted by its own internal problems which reduced its ability to exert global influence (Figure 33).<sup>64</sup> Others see a more prosperous America that adapted to changing trends and international conditions (Figure 34) by capitalizing on international advantages to solve many of its own internal issues.<sup>65</sup> By using a resourceful and adaptive grand strategy, America was able to improve its world role. Rather than become a ‘fortress America’ due to fears of grand terrorism, America found innovative ways to achieve “balance” by becoming more open, attractive, and prosperous while preserving its liberty and achieving security. As a

result America found creative solutions from its many future immigrants (answers from beyond its borders). James Canton sees future grand strategy qualities as having the ability to anticipate, adapt, and evolve through changing international conditions in order to provide increased national security and opportunity.<sup>66</sup>



**Figure 34. Grand Strategy Future Map<sup>67</sup>**

### Grand Strategy Envisioning a Brighter American Future

Grand strategy development can be driven by fear or hope. Visionaries like Thomas P.M. Barnett book "Blueprint for Action," or David Korten's book "The Great Turning from Empire to Earth Community," or Bill Bradley's "A New American Story" suggest positive grand strategy possibilities for achieving a prosperous American future.<sup>68</sup> James Canton's book "The Extreme Future" envisions major challenges for ahead for America (**Figure 34**).<sup>69</sup> Barnett states that strategists tend to use "chaos as

a guiding strategic principle,” by focusing efforts to “prevent horrific future scenarios” rather than building “a future worth creating.”<sup>70</sup> Again, we are back to seeking “ends” worthy of achieving and “national interests” worthy of pursuit.

James Canton, CEO and Chairman for Global Futures, see grand strategy (**Figure 34**) as a “future road map” or national vision creating grand possibilities, a more complete picture of a brighter and hopeful future.<sup>71</sup> Grand Strategy brings a larger global context in focus and brings into view different trends, needed changes, and encourages national inspiration.<sup>72</sup> Grand vision should encourage seeking “new directions” never considered, solving future challenges, and rallying national efforts towards a “new grand destiny”.<sup>73</sup>

## FUTURE VISIONS OF WORLD ORDERS

WORLD ORDER VISION	WESTERN VICTORY	CULTURE CLASH	BALANCED WORLD	EASTERN VICTORY	COMMUNITY EARTH
<b>Theme</b>	Western World Wins	Clash of Civilizations	Globalization VS Fragmentation	Eastern World Wins	Global Cooperation and Local Harmony
<b>Author</b>	Francis Fukuyama	Samuel Huntington	Benjamin Barber	David Pyne	David Korten
<b>Currents</b>	Western democracy and capitalism prevails as a result of globalization, systems, and institutions	Historical roots, tradition, language, and religion both divides and unites	Globalization allows flow of people, ideas, and capital but is countered by national tribalism	Eastern powers form political and economic coalitions; China, India, and Russia dominate the global economy	World shifts away from international globalization to one of greater international cooperation and local community
<b>Conflict</b>	Slow gradual change and shift towards more globalization and breaking down of state barriers	Conflict is the forefront and world stage	Conflict is the background and is more localized rather than globalized	America and Europe decline in economic power and influence	Conflict is in the background with rogue states and free lance terrorism being kept at a minimum
<b>Focus</b>	Reduction of threats and reducing the gap	Fault lines will continue to clash	Clash between Jihad and McWorld	Rise of Eastern Power	Balancing and redistribution of global wealth
<b>Result</b>	VICTORY	CLASH	BALANCE	DEFEAT	HARMONY

**Table 6. Future Global Visions.**<sup>74</sup>

## **Competing New World Visions**

The final end state of great grand strategy is arriving at “new world orders” (**Table 6**).

Theorists and scholars envision **five** competing and speculative global futures:

- (1) Western Victory, (2) Culture Clash, and (3) Balanced World (4) Eastern Victory, and
- (5) Earth Community.<sup>75</sup>

**1. Western Victory:** This future world version results in a victory of American and Western grand strategies. A favorable world order has been achieved for America. Globalization, western ideas, democracy, and capitalism have demonstrated superiority over all others. Fukuyama calls this concept “The End of History.”<sup>76</sup>

**2. Culture Clash:** This global version expects the intense conflict and struggle between cultures to continue. History, tradition, language, and religion between cultures unites and divides the world. Huntington calls this “The Clash of Civilizations.”<sup>77</sup>

**3. Balanced World:** This world version envisions a continuing clash between “globalization and fragmentation” with neither side winning out over the other. Nation states allow an increased globalization flow of “goods, capital, people, and ideas” to circulate. In direct conflict to globalization, the “tribulation of nations” creates new divisions between peoples. Barber calls this “Jihad versus McWorld.”<sup>78</sup>

**4. Eastern Victory:** America and Europe decline in influence while China, India, and Russia rise in power. America’s debt catches up and Europe becomes too dependent on external energy supplies. Eastern grand strategy triumphs over the West.<sup>79</sup>

**5. Earth Community:** This idealist version sees a cooperative and harmonized world order through multilateral cooperative security. Globalization is replaced by local and regional economies.<sup>80</sup>

## **Matching Grand Strategy with World Vision**

The challenge is matching an appropriate grand strategy against the five envisioned future world orders (**Table 6**). Grand strategy is a product of ideology based on one's perceptions of the nature of man, the nation state, international system, and security and power (see **Chapter II, Figure 16**). Within this conceptual framework, this project lays out potential grand strategies that could work within each world vision's strategic context (**Table 7**) by keeping in mind challenges and hazards.

World Vision	Challenges	Grand Strategy	Hazards
<b>Western Victory</b>	Stay the course with promoting democracy and capitalism; advance favorable relations with China, India, and other growing powers	Power, Control, Free Hand, Cooperation	Avoiding alienating the world community through unsound policy and globalization measures
<b>Culture Clash</b>	Dealing with persistent conflict; shaping favorable perceptions	Power, Control, Free Hand, Cooperation, Isolation	Avoiding strategic overextension and over commitment
<b>Balanced World</b>	Dealing with persistent conflict; advancing globalization; shaping perceptions	Power, Control, Free Hand, Cooperation	Avoiding strategic overextension and over commitment
<b>Eastern Victory</b>	Avoiding an Eastern political, economic, and military victory	Power, Control, Free Hand, Cooperation	Avoiding bankruptcy, poor economy, and poor policies
<b>Community Earth</b>	Getting nation states to contribute to collective security	Cooperation	Avoiding chaos, instability, and regional power struggles

**Table 7. Grand Strategy Matching.**<sup>81</sup>

There are five major groups of grand strategies which will be reviewed in **Chapter VI**. The challenge then, after reviewing potential global visions, becomes which grand strategy would work best in today's strategic environment in shaping the world towards America's favor. This will be discussed in **Chapter VII**.

## CHAPTER VI. WHAT ARE THE PROPOSED GRAND STRATEGIES?

Strategy and strategic thinking are not passwords for success. Poor strategy like medicine will kill. If policy makers seek the impossible...then no choice of strategy will help them much.<sup>1</sup>

Colin S. Gray, 1990

**Research Format.** This research project uses the following format to “narrow down” the field of grand strategies and reach a conclusion using the following **five step** process: (1) Identification, (2) Elimination, (3) Screening, (4) Compare and Contrast, and (5) Recommendations.




Figure 35. Spectrum of Grand Strategies<sup>2</sup>

**STEP 1. Identification.** The first step of this project is identifying what grand strategies are being proposed in the general field of study. This project has identified at least 20 proposed American grand strategies which are illustrated in **Figure 35**. These grand strategies can be organized into five major groups: (1) Isolation

(Withdraw), (2) Cooperation, (3) Free Hand (Choice), (4) Control (Containment), and (5) Power. These five major strategies lie between the two major empire and earth community vision themes (discussed in **Chapter II**) and the vision of a strong nation state (nationalism).

**STEP 2. Elimination.** The second step of this project is eliminating grand strategies that use different names but share similar concepts, in order to reduce the field of study. This is accomplished this by grouping all grand strategies into **five** major categories that advocate similar concepts (**Figure 34**): (1) withdraw, (2) cooperation, (3) choice, (4) control, or (5) power.

**STEP 3. Screening.** The third step of this project is applying screening criteria to further eliminate the remaining grand strategies down to a workable group of four. This project uses the screening criteria “dominant – subordinate,” which means that one concept of grand strategy can be subordinate or incorporated into a more dominate grand strategy. The off shore balancing concept is used by isolationism and selective engagement and can be eliminated. This project also eliminates grand strategies of control like rollback and containment which can be incorporated into strategies of power (using the premise that control comes from a base of power). The remaining grand strategies selected for study are: 1) Neo-Isolationism, 2) Selective Engagement, 3) Collective Security, and 4) Primacy.

**STEP 4. Compare and Contrast.** In **Chapter VI** (this chapter), the fourth step of this project compares and contrasts the selected strategies that show potential promise.

**STEP 5. Recommendations.** In **Chapter VII**, this project recommends which grand strategy best addresses America’s future strategic needs.

## **The Grand Strategy of Neo Isolationism**

The Grand Strategy of Neo Isolationism is supported by Liberal Progressives, Nationalists, Non-Interventionists, Defensive Realists. As America's first grand strategy, isolationism was advocated by President Washington and comes from the realist and Jeffersonian schools. Isolationism can also be called Exit Strategy, Disengagement, Withdrawal, Restraint, and Retrenchment.<sup>3</sup> This strategy has strong "come home America" appeal, and its advocates include Edward A. Olsen.<sup>4</sup> As America's first grand strategy, isolationism as advocated by President Washington and comes from the Realist and Jeffersonian schools.<sup>5</sup> Isolationists oppose internationalism which means "deeper debt, higher taxes, and more graveyards."<sup>6</sup> The goals of isolationism are to narrow national interests and perceived global threats by reducing U.S. commitments and liabilities.<sup>7</sup> With the collapse of the Soviet Union, America does not require a large military for protection; the world can take care of itself without U.S. intervention.<sup>8</sup> Isolationism relies primarily on unilateral efforts but shifts to multilateral if attacked by hegemonies;<sup>9</sup> uses a stand back strategic approach;<sup>10</sup> relies on: (a) off shore balance of power for maintaining global stability and (b) a strong military, nuclear deterrence, and maritime geography for maintaining U.S. security.<sup>11</sup>

**Neo Isolationism's features** include: 1) Use of Force - Sparingly; only to protect vital interests; defend the nation against attack; indifferent to hegemonies unless directly attacked.<sup>12</sup> 2) Strategic disengagement - abandons all forward based postures in Europe and Asia; brings troops home and returns to fortress America;<sup>13</sup> overseas bases are considered wasteful, irrelevant, and harmful.<sup>14</sup> 3) Strategic independence - (a) ends strategic burdens by curtailing costly and dangerous entangling alliances; Israel and

Taiwan do not require U.S. support; (b) avoids conflicts, wars, frequent interventions, nation building, adventurism, and preserves freedom of action; (c) relies on the United Nations.<sup>15</sup> 4) Economy and sustainability - cuts military spending to 50% of cold war level for western hemisphere defense; keeps some military forces for emergency intervention; perceives peace dividend and frees funding for domestic issues.<sup>16</sup> 5) Strategic Burden shifting - stops subsidizing global security and forces nations to fund their own security.<sup>17</sup> 6) Strategic preservation of power - preserves military might at home to respond against more potentially dangerous future scenarios.

**Neo Isolationism's disadvantages** include: 1) Global leadership and power – risks creating anarchy via global power vacuum with absence of America's stabilizing influence;<sup>18</sup> 2) Global influence - curtails ability to shape regional developments to US advantage;<sup>19</sup> U.S. could be viewed as being disinterested in international affairs,<sup>20</sup> 3) Strategic trip wire – no overseas trading “space for time” is provided by allies or fall back position if strategy fails,<sup>21</sup> 4) Global strategic reserve - no ready allies if immediate coalitions are needed;<sup>22</sup> leaves the U.S. isolated, vulnerable, and exposed,<sup>23</sup> 5) Strategic response - requires more time on short notice to prepare and organize coalitions;<sup>24</sup> lacks strategic facilitation for waging war (with no overseas bases).<sup>25</sup>

### **The Grand Strategy of Selective Engagement**

The Grand Strategy of Selective Engagement is supported by Nationalists, Internationalists, and Defensive Realists. Selective engagement comes from the realist and Hamiltonian schools.<sup>26</sup> This strategy's leading advocates include Robert J. Art, Andrew C. Goldberg, Steven Evera, and Christopher Layne.<sup>27</sup> Selective engagement's goals are to: 1) prevent the spread of WMD, 2) maintain world peace and stability, 3)

preserve energy security, and 4) avoid frequent interventions.<sup>28</sup> The U.S role in world should be one of restraint, prudent judgment, and moderation.<sup>29</sup> Selective engagement's methodology is multi-lateral or unilateral and uses a hedging strategy.<sup>30</sup>

**Selective Engagement's features** include: 1) Strategic balance – advocates “In theater” balancing rather than “off shore” balancing.<sup>31</sup> 2) Global role – provides global leadership; rejects global cop role.<sup>32</sup> 3) Strategic assurance – reassures allies and regional actors without dominance to avoid confrontation.<sup>33</sup> 4) Forward deployed forces - rejects isolationism and keeps forward based posture in Europe and Asia for prevention but rims them down; provides rapid troop reinforcement as needed.<sup>34</sup> 5) Strategic commitments - keeps some core ones; avoids permanent ones.<sup>35</sup> 6) Use of force - avoids frequency interventions, only for vital interests and humanitarian concerns; uses military superiority to preserve unilateral freedom of action.<sup>36</sup> 7) Strategic response - facilitates waging war, if necessary.<sup>37</sup>

**Selective Engagement disadvantages** include: 1) Vulnerable to the loss of American economic power, 2) Hollowing out of America's alliances 3) Risks entanglement in conflicts, 4) Loss of selectivity, 5) Countervailing coalitions, 6) Vulnerable to loss of public support, and 7) Assumes risk for selective interventions.<sup>38</sup> The biggest disadvantage is if the U.S. fails to practice self restraint.

### **The Grand Strategy of Cooperative Security**

The Grand Strategy of Cooperative Security is supported by Idealism, Liberalism, Internationalism, and Progressives. This strategy comes from the Idealist and Wilsonian schools advocating guiding principles and moral leadership.<sup>39</sup> Cooperative security's basic premise is that the American unilateralism era will be brief, new rival

powers will eventually rise, and the world will shift from a unipolar to multi-polar.<sup>40</sup>

Advocates recommend using U.S. power now to shape a future multilateral world order to best serve America's long term interests.<sup>41</sup> Global security is best achieved through concerted group cooperative efforts, rather than single nation state efforts.<sup>42</sup>

Cooperative security's goal is to encourage internal security by diminishing the importance of nation state powers within a structured new international order.<sup>43</sup> The U.S global role is seen as a partner in a shared multi-polar order.<sup>44</sup> Cooperative security's methodology uses international institutions to maintain security contained by international law and organizations.<sup>45</sup>

**Cooperative Security's features** include: 1) Strategic interdependence – global security is based on an international system.<sup>46</sup> An international force would disarm rogue nations causing regional instability or in noncompliance.<sup>47</sup> 2) Strategic security burden – shares load and division of labor among all, and 3) Strategic Intervention - sparse, only for vital interests to deter aggressor states or selective humanitarian concerns.<sup>48</sup>

**Cooperative Security's disadvantages** include: 1) Very Idealistic – Dale Davis states that "in theory it holds greater promise, but its utopian nature is suspect."<sup>49</sup> Could such an idealized international security system work in a world of hidden agendas, competing self interests, and historical rivalries? 2) Cooperation – The strategy relies exclusively on international power to bind aggressor states.<sup>50</sup> 3) Nation state power – America with other nations may lose some measure of sovereignty.<sup>51</sup> 4) Recruitment and Multi-consensus – Nations must be persuaded to answer the call for collective action for global interventions and to go to war.<sup>52</sup> This form of strategy relies on strong

international commitment, cooperation, and self restraint.<sup>53</sup> 5) Capabilities – Cooperative security requires sufficient international multilateral credibility and capabilities which do not exist now.<sup>54</sup> 6) Military Burden – The mismatch between America's military supremacy and weak international militaries, may require the U.S. to initially assume the largest burden for security forces.<sup>55</sup> Arms Control – This strategy relies on supportive arms control measures for global stability.<sup>56</sup>

### **The Grand Strategy of Primacy**

The Grand Strategy of Primacy is supported by Crusaders, Interventionists, Nationalists, Internationalists, and Offensive Realists. This strategy comes from the realist and Jacksonian schools.<sup>57</sup> Primacy advocates include Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, and Michael Michdelbaum.<sup>58</sup> Implemented in 2002, primacy uses dominance and deterrence to make the world safe for democracy and envisions an Americanized world order.<sup>59</sup> With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world is even more unstable and dangerous due to terrorism, WMD, rogue or failed states.<sup>60</sup> Without strong US leadership, world order may collapse and return to the dark ages.<sup>61</sup> America can not dependent on international organizations maintain global order.<sup>62</sup> Therefore, the U.S. should strengthen alliances, increase military spending, and force structure.<sup>63</sup> Primacy's stance is aggressive, proactive, and uses multi-lateral or unilateral to restore world stability through force, intervention, or regime change.<sup>64</sup>

**Primacy's features** include: 1) Strategic initiative and use of force - uses Prevention and Pre-emption; reserves the right to strike first.<sup>65</sup> 2) Strategic military supremacy - makes America's military power the strongest in the world, second to none, and facilitates waging war, if necessary.<sup>66</sup> 3) Soft Power - spreads democracy and

facilitates nation building.<sup>67</sup> 4) Strategic response - resists commitments that limit America's autonomy to act unilaterally, uses military supremacy to preserve unilateral freedom of action.<sup>68</sup> 5) Strategic deterrence - guarantees conventional security; possesses nuclear deterrence arsenal.<sup>69</sup> 6) Global dominance - prevents rising hegemonies and challenges to U.S. power and security.<sup>70</sup>

**Primacy's disadvantages** include: 1) Intervention - risks more frequent interventions by being drawn into new conflicts, 2) Domestic Cost - expensive; dependent upon a prosperous economy; prevents U.S. economy from growing faster, 3) Nation building - assumes liability for most cost, 4) Military force - requires a large military force to exert its global leadership, power, and influence, 5) Global Security Cost - assumes largest cost burden.<sup>71</sup>

### **Comparative Analysis**

In conducting a comparative analysis, these grand strategies share a number of similarities, in that they rely on: (1) Military force - a highly trained, well equipped, and professional military with cutting edge technology, (2) Use of force - to some degree in achieving their objectives, (3) Ideology – using American principles and values for justification, (4) Support - politically and domestic support, (5) Wealth - a strong and prosperous economy, (6) Organizations - use of international institutions, like the United Nations, to some degree, (7) Nation States – relies on healthy states for global stability and as potential allies against terrorism, rogue states, and rising hegemonies.<sup>72</sup>

### **Contrasting Analysis**

In conducting a contrasting analysis (**Table 8**), these grand strategies have major differences: (1) Envisioned World Order - isolationism, cooperative security, selective

engagement sees a multi-polar world and Primacy sees a uni-polar world. (2) America's Role - isolationism sees a republic, collective security sees a global partner, selective security sees a global leader, and primacy sees a global leader and global cop. (3) National Interests – isolationism narrows them, while the strategies expand them. (4) Stance – primacy is aggressive while the others are non-confrontational. (5) Achieving security – isolationism uses withdraw while cooperative security uses group security strength, selective engagement uses prudence/restraint, and primacy uses dominance by power (**Table 8**).<sup>73</sup>

## GRAND STRATEGY COMPARISON

Grand Strategy	Isolationism	Cooperative Security	Selective Engagement	Primacy
<b>View of World Order:</b>	Multi-Polar	Multi-Polar	Multi-Polar	Uni-Polar
<b>America's Role:</b>	Republic	Global Partner & Facilitator	Global Leader	Global Leader & Global Cop
<b>Goal:</b>	Withdraw and disengagement	Multi-Polar World Order	Prevent Spread of WMD/Avoid Frequency Intervention	Americanized World Order
<b>Methodology:</b>	Unilateral	Multilateral	Multilateral or Unilateral	Multilateral or Unilateral
<b>National Interests:</b>	Narrow	Broad	Broad	Broad
<b>Stance:</b>	Non-confrontational	Cooperative	Non-confrontational	Aggressive
<b>Purpose for Security:</b>	Fortress America	Group Strength	Prudent Restraint	Dominance
<b>Use of Force:</b>	Sparingly	Collective Good	Discretionary	Extensively
<b>Force Size:</b>	Small	Medium	Large	Large
<b>Forward Based Units:</b>	None	Some	Some	Extensive
<b>Cost:</b>	Moderate	Moderately Expensive	Moderately Expensive	Highly Expensive
<b>Commitments:</b>	Avoids	Some	Some	Many
<b>Security Burden:</b>	Support Own	Sharing	Sharing	Assumes Burden

**Table 8. Comparison of Grand Strategies**<sup>74</sup>

(6) Use of force – Isolationism uses sparingly; cooperative security uses for collective good; selective engagement uses discretionary, and primacy uses extensively.

(7) Force size – Isolationism and cooperative security both require smaller forces, while selective engagement and primacy both require larger forces. (8) Forward based forces – Isolationism wants none, primacy wants many, while selective engagement and cooperative security requires some. (9) Cost – Isolationism is least costly, primacy is most costly, while selective engagement and cooperative security are moderately expensive. (10) Alliances and Commitments – Isolationism avoids them, while the others use them to different degrees. (11) Security burdens – primacy assumes most of the burden while the others emphasize burden sharing.

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY	TERRORISM GRAND STRATEGY
Build World Order	Destroy Western Civilization
Promotion of American values, principles, democracy, civil rights, and free markets	Discredits Western idealism and culture; recruits new radical Islamic followers
Reduce strategic threats; regime change; nation building of fallen rogue states	Seeks long term strategic exhaustion of the West
Seeks protection and security through military supremacy and power projection	Gets West to overextend and over commit limited resources by defending everywhere
Seeks global security and stability; rule by law; promotion of justice	Seeks grand Jihad against the West; increase bleeding through savagery; uses media to promote extremely distorted perceptions of Western atrocities
Seeks to inspire global cooperation, resolve, and unity	Seeks to inspire followers to break nation will by causing democracies to become fearful, disillusioned, and lose heart
Seeks a proactive strategic response	Probes for new strategic weakness
Expensive; seeks systemic solutions through institutions and organizations; extensive use of hard power	Inexpensive; economical; creative; adaptive; asymmetrical; non traditional means
Seeks opportunities for prosperity and security	Seeks opportunities to advance radical Islamic ideology by confronting the West

**Table 9. American Versus Opposing Grand Strategies**<sup>75</sup>

The real test will be how well new American grand strategy will take on opposing grand strategies. For the purposes of this project, the selected adversarial strategy to deal with is terrorism grand strategy which poses the greatest threat (**Table 9**). Opposing grand strategies either seek to erode, paralyze, challenge, or marginalize U.S. power

(see **Chapter V, Figure 28**). How would each of the selected American grand strategies stack up? Isolationism would probably not be as effective since the world is too globally and digitally interconnected. Even if America wanted to withdraw, grand terrorism would still not leave America alone. America is a too large of a target of opportunity to be left untouched by future terrorists because of what it represents, what it stands for, and its influence in the world. Even if America became more secure within its shoreline (via the fortress America), Americans would still be vulnerable abroad. The new 21st century challenge is for America to protect its citizens on a global scale (redefining of America's borders). Cooperative Security, Primacy and Selective Engagement grand strategies could work well against a Terrorism grand strategy.

Our current grand strategy of primacy is a Quad IV strategy (discussed in Chapters I and IV) – it is expensive, requires frequent intervention, nation building, stretches the military, and over extends political will. Primacy is difficult to sustain over the long term because it is highly resource intensive and could cost 2.4 trillion by 2017.<sup>76</sup> America's strategy has been to purchase "hegemony on the cheap" through cheap credit.<sup>77</sup> With rising trade deficit, national debt, and the continuing devaluation of the U.S. dollar, how long will foreign nations continue to lend America money?<sup>78</sup> How long can American primacy be sustained? According to the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) report for 17 AUG 2007 cheap credit available to the U.S. Government from social trust funds could disappear around 2015 which could translate into significant defense cuts.<sup>79</sup> As the U.S. "builds up" its military force over the next few years, there are also proposed plans to "reduce" the future force structure.<sup>80</sup> Is PAX Americana at the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning?<sup>81</sup> What should be America's next grand strategy?

## CHAPTER VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

America is not to be Rome nor Britain, it is to be America.<sup>1</sup>  
Charles M. Beard

### What Should Be America's Next Grand Strategy?

**STEP 5.** The fifth and final step of this project is to recommend a new grand strategy. After analyzing, comparing, and contrasting the selected range of possible strategies, I firmly believe that the grand strategy of **selective engagement** will work best for America. First, this project will review the other **three** strategic alternatives.

**1. The Grand Strategy of Isolationism.** America's leadership in globalization, world security, and economic interconnectivity, makes it unlikely that the nation would adopt isolationism. First, 9-11 is still very fresh in American minds. Second, the U.S. is highly dependent on foreign capital, workers, factories, technology, and credit to support its high consumerism. America needs the world, but does the world need America? Expect America to become much more engaging rather than retreating.

**2. The Grand Strategy of Cooperative Security.** America is unlikely to abdicate the throne of global leadership any time soon – especially if it is expected to assume much of the initial “start up” cost for cooperative security. Is the world ready? Are nations willing to pay for collective security after they have benefited from PAX Americana as free riders?

**3. The Grand Strategy of Primacy.** America will probably abandon primacy when cheap credit disappears, the trade deficit, and national debt finally reach intolerable levels – forcing the nation to live within its means. Primacy carries heavy international and financial liabilities. This strategy uses muscular dominance to advance its interests but it also generates world alienation and antagonism. Like Atlas, America

carries global security on its shoulders while the world becomes wealthier at America's expense. The U.S. is kept busy dealing with transnational terrorists, rogue states, and Islamic extremism which requires frequent intervention and costly nation building.

Expect America to gravitate towards new grand strategy with new political leadership.

**Why Would Selective Engagement Work?** This strategy meets **four** conditions for a new grand strategy to win over its alternatives:

**1. The Right Movement.** A new 2009 incoming Presidential administration will occupy the White House bringing new players, ideas, priorities, and directions.

**2. Feasibility.** Selective engagement is a more moderate and sustainable "long term" grand strategy to best protect our national interests. This strategy promotes America's national interests by preserving our global leadership, a strong military, strategic freedom of maneuver, use of allies, use of overseas bases, and promoting economic and energy strategies. Selective engagement can also be viewed as a "transitional" or a "bridge" grand strategy as the world eventually shifts to a multi-polar world putting America in a more favorable global position to advance its interests.

**A. New Directions.** A change in national leadership presents an open door for advancing new opportunities. Strategists, theorists, academicians, and political leaders offer many intriguing possibilities and creative strategic ideas. Perhaps, we will see a return to liberal internationalism or a movement towards regional collective security. The best designed grand strategies are not necessarily selected, but the most "politically accommodating" ones that show the greatest potential promise to the nation.<sup>2</sup>

**B. The Princeton Project Recommendations.** The Princeton Project on National Security envisions a long range future trend towards a multi-polar world.<sup>3</sup> This

project recommends future American grand strategy that promotes multilateralism and develops new institutions to support regional collective security.

**3. Support.** Is the novelty of Primacy wearing off? Selective engagement might appeal to both conservatives and liberals looking for new positive directions and alternatives over our current grand strategy.

**4. Cultural appeal.** Selective engagement seeks a common ground, one that advances America values, principles, that unifies, and builds political solvency. This strategy encourages our allies to contribute more to global security (burden shifting). Selective and reduced interventions with political restraint will make a difference. A highly trained expeditionary military force that is well equipped with cutting edge technology will still be required. The use of hard power will not be enough; America must bring all its instruments of national power to bear (a better use of statecraft, greater soft power solutions, new economic initiatives, energy independence, increased immigration, revenue generation, and reducing national debt). An improved anti-missile umbrella for national defense will also reduce national vulnerability.

Some strategists and theorists calculate that the United States has about 20 to 30 years before losing its global power and influence.<sup>4</sup> Selective engagement buys time for America to invest in a future grand strategy that will revitalize its economy, stimulate its growth and development, and enhance its security. Since the U.S. is at its zenith, now is the time to focus national efforts to building a favorable world order. When America's power begins to decline, this grand strategy will also help facilitate a transition to a multi-lateral world. Sun Tzu said it best that strategy is "the road to survival or ruin."<sup>5</sup>

## Endnotes

### CHAPTER I. WHAT IS GRAND STRATEGY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

<sup>1</sup> James Clavell, *The Art of War - Sun Tzu*, (New York: The Dell Publishing, 1983).

<sup>2</sup> Yale University Website, Yale University's International Security Studies (ISS) Grand Strategy Academic Program; available from [http://research.yale.edu/iss/gs\\_info.html](http://research.yale.edu/iss/gs_info.html); Internet, accessed on 18 November 2007.

<sup>3</sup> James C. Gaston, *Grand Strategy and the Decision Making Process*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1992), 37. Bruce K. Holloway defines grand strategy as “the plan by which all elements of a society’s power are used to support its security objectives, 21. Bruce Palmer defines it as “the overall defense plans of a nation or coalition of nations. “the coordinated employment of total resources to achieve national objectives,” 73. See Bruce Palmer, Jr, editor, *Grand Strategy of the 1980’s*, (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1978).

<sup>4</sup> Francis Fukuyama, and John Ikenberry, The Princeton Project on National Security: Report of the Working Group on Grand Strategy Choices, Available from <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/GSC.pdf> and <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf>; Internet, accessed 18 November 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Gary Hart, *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty First Century*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 3-4), 21.

<sup>6</sup> Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st<sup>t</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 11.

<sup>7</sup> Richards Chet, “Grand Strategy,” Editor, Defense and National Interest; available from [http://www.d-n-l.net/fcs/boyd\\_grand\\_strategy.htm](http://www.d-n-l.net/fcs/boyd_grand_strategy.htm); Internet; accessed 6 September 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Figure 1. Grand Strategy Elements. Based on ideas and information expressed in Max Manwaring’s Book *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, (CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 127-129. Gregory Foster, National Defense University, contends that it is important to define the nature of grand strategy. He advocates that strategy may be characterized in a number of ways that help illuminate its meaning further – as a paradigm; as a philosophy of global contact; as a grand strategy; as an exercise in perceptions management; as a map to the future; as a marriage of ends and means. Foster advocates that when you combine doctrine with command philosophy, you create a vital concentricity of thought that contributes to the intellectual fabric of a nation’s security posture. See Gaston, 66-76.

<sup>9</sup> Manwaring, 127-129.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Figure 2. Towards a Definition of Grand Strategy. Based on ideas and information expressed in Max Manwaring's Book *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, (CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 127-129. Gibson, 66-76.

<sup>13</sup> Manwaring, 128, and Dueck, 171. Ends are important, but that is not to say that means are less significant. Dueck states that "to pursue a global grand strategy without providing the means –military, political, and economic – for it is to invite not only humiliation, but disaster."

<sup>14</sup> Manwaring, 128 and Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 12. Colin Gray also states that "Strategic analysis never losses sight of the logical truth that means makes sense only with respect to means." "Ends or goals, are not all that matter, because the cost of reaching them can be so high that they are not worth securing."

<sup>15</sup> Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, (London: A Century Foundation Book, 2003), 2.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 11.

<sup>18</sup> Hart, 170 and John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy.Com*, December 1, 2002; available from <http://freepublic.com/focus/f-news/1077054/posts>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2007. Gaddis contends that "past strategists would have felt more comfortable not revealing too much about their grand strategy. They would rather concentrate on implementing grand strategy and let historians explain it to future audiences." Grand strategy has not always been open to the public. It wasn't until 1947, that the grand strategy of containment was freely discussed with the general public."

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. John Lewis Gaddis states that "It's an interesting reflection on our democratic age that nations are now expected to publish their grand strategies before pursuing them."

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. John Lewis Gaddis states that “in 2002, President Bush invoked the “Periclean precedent that in a democracy even grand strategy is matter for public discussion.”

<sup>21</sup> Gaston, 37.

<sup>22</sup> Manwaring, 128.

<sup>23</sup> Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategy in War and Peace*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 2. See also Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), and Hart, 21.

<sup>24</sup> Kennedy, 2.

<sup>25</sup> Manwaring, 49.

<sup>26</sup> Scales, 31.

<sup>27</sup> Gaddis, 95.

<sup>28</sup> Chet, 1.

<sup>29</sup> Figure 3. Hierarchy of Strategy. Adapted from Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: A Little Book on Big Strategy*, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006), 12 and further modified to illustrate additional concepts of strategic relationships.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Figure 4. Grand Strategy and Theory Relationships. Hypothetical construct based on ideas from Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006).

<sup>32</sup> Dueck, 11. Also Gregory D Foster, National Defense University, contends that “grand strategy is theory. You must have theory as the basis of strategy. Strategy must have validity and legitimacy.” See Gaston, 59-60.

<sup>33</sup> Ikenberry, and Terror, 25.

<sup>34</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

<sup>35</sup> Figure 5. Grand Strategy Conceptual Framework. Hypothetical construct developed for this research project based on ideas from Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G.

Corr, and Robert H. Dorff. *The Search for a U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty First Century*, (Westport: Praeger/Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 118.

<sup>36</sup> Dueck, 11.

<sup>37</sup> Manwaring, 129.

<sup>38</sup> Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs Publications, 2004), 5.

<sup>39</sup> Mead, 24.

<sup>40</sup> Nye, 5.

<sup>41</sup> Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War, America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*, (New York: A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 2004), 24.

<sup>42</sup> Mead, 25.

<sup>43</sup> James J. Hentz, *The Obligation of Empire: United States's Grand Strategy for a New Century*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), viii.

<sup>44</sup> Mead, 17.

<sup>45</sup> Yale University's International Security Studies Grand Strategy academic program; available from [http://research.yale.edu/iss/gs\\_info.html](http://research.yale.edu/iss/gs_info.html), Internet; accessed 18 November 2007.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, The Grandest Strategy of them All, *Washington Post*, 17 December 2006; available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/15/AR2006121501832.html>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

<sup>48</sup> Charles A. Kuplan, and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Grand Strategy for a Divided America," *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 2007), 1.

<sup>49</sup> Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, *America's Strategic Choices*, (Boston: MIT Press, 2000), 246.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Gaston, v,142-158. Does the absence of a grand strategy matter? Carnes Lord, National Defense University, contends that without a grand strategy there is no focused national and policy efforts towards greater international purposes. The result is individual institutional bureaucratic efforts without focused effort. Grand strategy

requires organized national efforts, a centralization of power, and political consensus – to achieve a monopoly of international effect.

<sup>52</sup> Art, 2.

<sup>53</sup> Mead, 13.

<sup>54</sup> Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999, 218-219.

<sup>55</sup> Jordan, 218-219. For example, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, James Mann reports that Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Condoleezza Rice were the chief architects of the America's grand strategy of primacy. See James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcan: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, (New York: Penguin Books: 2004), 198.

<sup>56</sup> Robert A. Pfaltzgraft, Crisis Management and Complex Emergencies Seminar, Fletcher School, Tufts University, 4 December 2007.

<sup>57</sup> Jordan, 218-219.

<sup>58</sup> Donald E. Neuchterlein, *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World*, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1991, 13. What are our national purposes? Gary Hart suggest that "our nation's large purposes are to provide security, to expand opportunity, and to promote liberal democracy. See Hart, 15.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>61</sup> Figure 6. National Interests. Sources: Adapted from Donald Neuchterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy," in Terry L. Heyns, ed., *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A reader*, Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1983, 38. "National Interests;" available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_interest](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest); Internet; accessed 11 December 2007. Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

<sup>62</sup> Neuchterlein, 19-22. Robert Art identifies six overarching "national interests." (1) prevent an attack on U.S. soil, (2) prevent great power wars in Eurasia (reduce intense securities competitions), (3) preserve access to oil, (4) preserve an open international economic order, (5) spread democracy, and (6) protect the global environment (from the adverse effects of global warming and severe climate change). See Art, 7.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Figure 7. National Interests and Threats. Based on information from Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, (London: A Century Foundation Book, 2003), 7 and 79.

<sup>65</sup> Hart, 15.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Figure 8. Grand Strategy as a Balancing Act. Hypothetical construct developed for this project based on concepts collected to explain relationships and linkages. Initially based on ideas from Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006).

<sup>68</sup> Kennedy, 4 and Dueck, 11.

<sup>69</sup> Kupchan, 1.

<sup>70</sup> Kennedy, 2.

<sup>71</sup> Cass R. Sunstein, *Worse Case Scenario*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

<sup>72</sup> Yale.

<sup>73</sup> Dueck, 12-13.

<sup>74</sup> Figure 9. Political Culture Adjustments to Grand Strategy. Based on ideas and information from Dueck, 12.

<sup>75</sup> Dueck, 12-13.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>77</sup> Figure 10. Grand Strategy Adjustments to Threats. Based on ideas and information from Dueck, 26-30.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 18-19.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 18-19.

<sup>80</sup> Rosecrance, 96-101. Another translation of Thucydides is that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” See Book, V, Chapter 17, Thucydides, (Translated by Benjamin Jowett), *History of the Peloponnesian War*, (New York: Prometheus Book, 1998).

<sup>81</sup> Stein, 100.

<sup>82</sup> Figure 11. Grand Strategy Effectiveness. Based on ideas and information expressed in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, (New York: Cornell University press, 1993), 100.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Figure 12. Grand Strategy Levels. Theoretical construct developed for this project to help explain grand strategy relationships and linkages. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is often illustrated as a pyramid consisting of several levels: the four lower levels are grouped together as being associated with physiological needs, while the top level is termed growth needs associated with advanced needs. Once the basic needs are met, then the focus shifts to the higher levels. The higher needs in this hierarchy are considered when the lower needs in the pyramid are satisfied. See Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs; available at [Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow's\\_hierarchy\\_of\\_needs](Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow's_hierarchy_of_needs); Internet; accessed 17 January 2008. This project proposes that a similar theoretical concept can be applied to grand strategy. Once basic core national interests are met, nations can pursue greater international power of control and supremacy. Eventually, as nations grow and require greater status, they could pursue grand strategies with goals and visions of reshaping the world - truly producing "grand visions."

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz advanced the ideas of fog and friction of war and other theories in his book *Vom Kriege (On War)*." Donald Rumsfeld, *Department of Defense news briefing, February 12, 2002, was quoted as saying* : "As we know. There are known knowns. There are things, we know we know. We also know, there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things, we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know. We don't know."

<sup>90</sup> Hart, v.

<sup>91</sup> Figure 13 Principles of War and Grand Strategy. Based on ideas from Source 1: Manwaring, Max G., Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff. *The Search for a U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty First Century*, (Westport: Praeger/ Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 8. Manwaring suggests that there are essential principles to grand strategy development. The first is the "ends." It is the most important and it must be right. Source 2: Handel, Michael I., *Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini*, (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1992), 61. Handel suggests that some principles are timeless. "Strategy is a rational calculus of correlating ends with means.'

<sup>92</sup> Manwaring, 128-129.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Figure 14. Grand Strategy Nightmares. Based on ideas and information presented in Michael Lind's *The America Way of Strategy*, (New York: Oxford University, 2006), 13-18.

<sup>96</sup> Lind., 258, and the NSS.

<sup>97</sup> Gaddis, 37.

<sup>98</sup> Lind, 13-21.

<sup>99</sup> John Frankenheimer, *Seven days in May*, 118 min., Warner Home Video, 1964, DVD. The movie (starring Burt Lancaster and Kirk Douglas) involves a plot of U.S. military leaders to overthrow an unpopular President because he supports a nuclear disarmament treaty and they fear a Soviet attack. This concept is explored further in the movie "The Enemy Within" where senior military leaders plan a coup over their fierce opposition to budget cuts that they perceive as effectively disabling the U.S. armed forces. See Jonathan Darby, dir, *The Enemy Within*, 86 min., HBO Home Video, 1994. DVD.

<sup>100</sup> The book "1984" concerns life in a future totalitarian police state controlled by "big brother." See George Orwell, *1984*, (New York: Signet Classics, 1950). Bernan suggests that America could be just one more terrorist attack from becoming a police state. See Morris Bernan, *Dark Ages America: The Final Phase of Empire*, (New York: N.W. Norton and Company, 2006).

<sup>101</sup> The North American Union concept was first discussed at the North American Summit Meeting on 23 March 2005, which considered the possibility of a future merging of the U.S. Mexico, and Canada economically as well as politically. See Jerome R. Corsi, *The Late Great U.S.A.: The Coming Merger with Mexico and Canada*, (Los Angeles: WND Book, 2007).

<sup>102</sup> Johnson, 285, and David Cole, and Jules Lobel, *Less Safe, Less Free: Why America Is Losing the War on Terror*, (New York: The New Press, 2007). "Human rights and the rule of law are not only fundamental to democracy, but its strengths and weapons."

<sup>103</sup> Cass R. Sunstein, *Worse Case Scenario*, (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 2007), 3, 7, 216, 277, and Lind, 217.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER II. WHAT ARE THE FORCES AND ACTORS AT PLAY?

<sup>1</sup> Paul Rogers, *Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty First Century*, (Sterling, VA; Pluto Press), 2000.

<sup>2</sup> Dueck, 15, and McKinlay. Charles A. Kupchan, Georgetown Professor of International Politics, contends that of all world empires, America most resembles that of the British Empire using “off shore balancing” to send troops aboard to achieve “security, order, and a balance of power.” The Roman Empire sent troops to other nations to “conqueror and occupy.” See Suzy Hansen “The Decline and Fall of the American Empire: An expert on geopolitics says forget Islamic terrorism -- the real future threat to America's supremacy will come from Europe.” Available from <http://dir.salon.com/story/books/int/2002/12/02/kupchan/>; Internet: accessed 12 February 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Dueck, 33.

<sup>5</sup> Figure 15. Strategic Culture Influence on Grand Strategy. Theoretical construct based on ideas and information from Dueck, 9-43.

<sup>6</sup> Figure 16. The Nature of Grand Strategy. Based on ideas and information contained in Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, (Belmont: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2006), 512-519.

<sup>7</sup> Gibson,66-76.

<sup>8</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, “Realist or Idealist,” *The International Herald Tribune*, 12 May 2005; available from [www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/11/opinion/adkissinger.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/11/opinion/adkissinger.php); Internet; accessed 27 November 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Inis L. Claude Jr., Political Realism Revisited Comment, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, p.198; available from <http://www.jstor.org/view/00208833/di012045/01p02850/0?fame-nofram&userID=824>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2007.

<sup>10</sup> Mazlish, 155 -156.

<sup>11</sup> Dueck, 23.

<sup>12</sup> Dueck, 23, and Brzezinski, 21. Brzezinski estimation differs and sees British Empire span of world control at about 11 million square miles.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Mazlish, 155.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Mazlish, 155-157.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 155-156.

<sup>18</sup> Mazlish, 156.

<sup>19</sup> Dueck, 31, and Lieber, 32.

<sup>20</sup> Mazlish, 155-157.

<sup>21</sup> Dueck, 23, and Mazlish, 156.

<sup>22</sup> Mazlish, 157.

<sup>23</sup> Dueck, 33. Some consider the fathers of Realism to be Thucydides (*History of the Peloponnesian Wars*), Niccolo Machiavelli (*The Prince*), and Thomas Hobbs (*The Leviathan*). Realists debate among themselves over the nature of the state, the international system, order, power, stability, and security. For example, is order and security best achieved through a unipolar or bipolar world or is it the source of instability?

<sup>24</sup> Layne, 16-17.

<sup>25</sup> Lind, 37.

<sup>26</sup> Lind, 37, 182, and Gaston, 142,

<sup>27</sup> Figure 17. Impetus for Grand Strategy Change. Theoretical construct based on ideas and information from Dueck, 21-43.

<sup>28</sup> Dueck, and Lind, 182.

<sup>29</sup> Dueck, 33-35.

<sup>30</sup> Figure 18. Process for Changing Grand Strategy. Chart is based on ideas and information from Dueck, 21-43.

<sup>31</sup> Dueck, 41.

<sup>32</sup> Gaston, 145-149.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>35</sup> Table 1. Grand Strategy Types. Theoretical constructs based on ideas and information from Dueck, 11, Barnett, 1-3, Kennedy, 3, and Regan, 268-273.

<sup>36</sup> Barnett, 1-3 and Dueck, 11.

<sup>37</sup> Kennedy, 3.

<sup>38</sup> Dueck, 11.

<sup>39</sup> Barnett, 1-3.

<sup>40</sup> Dueck, 11.

<sup>41</sup> Regan, 268-273.

<sup>42</sup> Figure 19. Grand Strategy Themes. Based on ideas and information presented in David C. Korten, *The Great Turning Point: From Earth Community to Earth Community*, San Francisco: Kumarian Press, 2006, 27-56.

<sup>43</sup> Korten. 27-40.

<sup>44</sup> Table 2. Empire and World Community Contrast. Based on ideas and information presented in Korten, 32.

<sup>45</sup> Korten, 126-141, 181-200.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 27-56, 181-200. Perkins offers a “global definition of empire: (1) exploits resources from the land it dominates, (2) consumes large quantities of resources that are disproportionate to the size of its population relative to those of other nations, (3) maintains a large military that enforces its policies when more subtle measures fail, (4) spreads its language, literature, art, and various aspects of its culture through its sphere of influence, (5) taxes not just its citizens, but those of other nations, and (6) imposes its own currency on the lands under its control. Case in point, the U.S. dollar is the currency standard for world commerce.” See John Perkins, *The Secret History of the American Empire*, (New York: Dutton, 2007), 4-6.

<sup>47</sup> Table 3. Ancient and Modern Empire Comparison. Based on ideas and information presented in Korten, 32. Perkins advocates that empires are built on foundations of greed, secrecy, and excessive materialism.” See Perkins, 7.

<sup>48</sup> Korten, 27-56.

### CHAPTER III WHAT IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF A PAST GRAND STRATEGY?

<sup>1</sup> Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 169.

<sup>2</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, Georgetown Professor of International Politics, contends that of all world empires, America most resembles that of the British Empire using “off shore balancing” to send troops aboard to achieve “security, order, and a balance of power.” The Roman Empire sent troops to other nations to “conqueror and occupy.” See Suzy Hansen “The Decline and Fall of the American Empire: An expert on geopolitics says forget Islamic terrorism -- the real future threat to America’s supremacy will come from Europe.” Available from <http://dir.salon.com/story/books/int/2002/12/02/kupchan/>; Internet: accessed 12 February 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Brzezinski.

<sup>4</sup> Layne, 20 and McCoughty, 24-41. McCoughty, Air Vice-Marshal E.J. Kingston, *The Spectrum of Conflict: A Study of Policy and Strategy in Modern War*, (London: Jonathan Cape Publishers, 1964). “The geography of a nation influences its grand strategy. Likewise, the interplay of and interrelationships of the elements has rendered certain features of geography strategically more important than others and worthy of serious consideration in security matters.”

<sup>5</sup> Layne, 20.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Schwartz, 4.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Figure 20. British Empire Map. Adapted from Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chess Board: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, (New York: Basic Books: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 18 and 20.

<sup>10</sup> Brzezinski, 21.

<sup>11</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the America Empire*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 15.

<sup>12</sup> Brzezinski, 21.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Brown, 57.

<sup>16</sup> Brzezinski, 20.

<sup>17</sup> "PAX Britannica," Available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pax\\_Britannica](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pax_Britannica) Internet, accessed 20 November 2007.

<sup>18</sup> Figure 21. British Grand Strategy. Based on ideas and information from three sources: (1) Brzezinski, 18 and 19, (2) Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, 170-171, and (3) Amy Chua, *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall*, (New York: Doubleday Publications, 2007).

<sup>19</sup> Amy Chua, *Day of Empire*, (New York: Doubleday Publishers, 2007).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Brzezinski, 21.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Art, 176-197, and Brown 244-282.

<sup>24</sup> Layne, 20.

<sup>25</sup> Schwartz, 4.

<sup>26</sup> Kennedy, 3.

#### CHAPTER IV. WHY DO WE NEED A NEW GRAND STRATEGY?

<sup>1</sup> Hentz, viii.

<sup>2</sup> Lieber, 25.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, Thomas P.M., *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons/Penguin Group, 2004), 1.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Palmer, Jr, Bruce, *Grand Strategy of the 1980's*, (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research), 1978, 19.

<sup>7</sup> Hentz, 203.

<sup>8</sup> John Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," *Survival*, Vol. 43, No.4. (Winter 2001-2002), The Institute for Strategic Studies, 19-34.

<sup>9</sup> Hentz, 203.

<sup>10</sup> James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, (New York: The Penguin Group, 2004).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 198-200.

<sup>13</sup> Hentz,17.

<sup>14</sup> Dueck, 41-42, 233 - 234. David Korten stated that 9-11 "dealt a devastating blow to our self identity and sense of security. Suddenly it was clear that we were hated by people who have the means to do us substantial harm and from whom our expansive military establishment offers no protection." See Korten, 234.

<sup>15</sup> Figure 22. The Bush Doctrine. Illustrated conceptual diagram based on information from the National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.

<sup>16</sup> NSS and Lieber, 43.

<sup>17</sup> Hart, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Mead,162 and Schwarz, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Gaddis, 95. Paul Roger's argues that the paradigm of western nation states "maintaining global status quo through economic and political dominance backed up by military forces reconfigured to emphasize rapid deployment, long range strikes, and counter-insurgency" is not sustainable over the long term. See Paul Rogers, *Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty First Century*. (Sterling, VA; Pluto Press, 2000).

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 95-101.

<sup>22</sup> John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2002). Christopher Layne contends that an American grand strategy based on moral absolutism is a "prescription for inviting conflict", not promoting peace.<sup>20</sup> Patrick J. McDonald, University of Texas Professor, states that "the mix" of U.S. democratization and militarism is "an effective receipt for empowering groups hostile to U.S. interests." See Layne, 122, and McDonald, 23.

<sup>22</sup> Trubowitz, 3.

<sup>23</sup> Kuplan, 1, and Nuechterlein, 15, and Gibson, 161.

<sup>24</sup> Hart, 3.

<sup>25</sup> Kupchan, 1

<sup>26</sup> Trubowitz, 2-4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 2-4, 183.

<sup>28</sup> Trubowitz, 3.

<sup>29</sup> Mead, 23 and Hart, 3.

<sup>30</sup> Trubowitz.

<sup>31</sup> Differ roles imply difference grand strategies. See Chapter IV.

<sup>32</sup> "To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower,'" *The International Herald Tribune*, 5 February 1999; available from [http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/02/05/france.t\\_0.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/02/05/france.t_0.php); Internet; accessed 8 November 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Hardt, Preface.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Gaddis, 107.

<sup>39</sup> Burman.

<sup>40</sup> Hardt, Preface.

<sup>41</sup> Gaddis, 107.

<sup>42</sup> John B. Foster, and Robert W. McChesney, *Pox Americana: Exposing the America Empire*, (New York: Monthly Review Press), 2004.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Joseph Gerson, *Empire and the Bomb: How the U.S. Uses Nuclear Weapons to Dominate the World*, (London; Pluto Press, 2007), 32-33, 37-38. Joseph Gerson contends that since the bombing of Hiroshima, every U.S. President has threatened nuclear war (use of the imperial hammer).

<sup>46</sup> Emmanuel Todd believes that America pursues a policy of “theatrical micro militarism” by “picking fights with third world countries like Iraq to convince” world powers of its “military prowess” and validate its “global policeman” image. See Emmanuel Todd, *After the Empire*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Is America a rogue state? The term was coined by the U.S. to describe states hostile to U.S. policy. In return, some nations have called America a “superpower rogue state.” “At first glance, the U.S. has the hallmarks of looking like a classic rogue state: its policy is aggressive, it ignores international law, it is relentless in its pursue of WMD, has a large WMD stockpile and has tried to overthrow at least 45 regimes since 1945.” “However, this is also a distorted and inaccurate view. The U.S. is not responsible for all the World’s ills, has strong tradition of acting against wrong and oppression, and can be an enormous force for good. America is still seen as a beacon of world hope, which is why foreign visas and immigration has been on the rise.” See The Foreign Policy Center: New Directions in Global Thinking; Is America a Rogue State; available from <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/247.pdf>; Internet: accessed 20 January 2008.

<sup>47</sup> Gaddis, 111.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Niall Ferguson, When Empires Wane: the End of Power, *Opinion Journal: From the Wall Street Journal*, available from <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244>; Internet; accessed 26 November 2007, and Gaddis, 111.

<sup>50</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the America Empire*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2004, 16).

<sup>51</sup> Cullen Murphy, *Are We Rome?*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007), 5. Murphy sees interesting parallels between a modern America and ancient Rome build on broad issues rather than superficially similarities: (1) expensive and overstretched military – “too large to be affordable and too small to do everything asked of it,” (2) uneasy about its porous borders, (3) a messianic sense of global mission, (4) solipsism - exaggerated self identity; ignorance of others; presumption of privilege and arrogance, (5) facing barbarian invasions like foreign corporations buying American businesses, (6) corrupt patronage to privatize government service (selling public good for profit and out sourcing). On the positive idealistic side, Murphy states that “the founding fathers were clear to think of America as a new and better Roman Republic with all its citizens enjoying equal responsibility and privileges.”

<sup>52</sup> Brzezinski, 21-29.

<sup>53</sup> Mazlish, 124.

<sup>54</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (The American Empire Project), (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 285.

<sup>55</sup> Figure 23. Why Empires Fall. Based on ideas and information contained in Johan Galtung, Professor of Peace Studies, "The Decline and Fall of Empires: A Theory of Redevelopment; <http://www.transcend.org/galt.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2008.

<sup>56</sup> Barnett, 355.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Jack Synder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (New York: Cornell University, 1991), 1-6.

<sup>59</sup> Synder, 1-6.

<sup>60</sup> Lind, 8 and Hart, 13.

<sup>61</sup> Ferguson, and Colossus, 16.

<sup>62</sup> Hart, 16.

<sup>63</sup> Brzezinski, 10.

<sup>64</sup> Hardt, 235.

<sup>65</sup> Agnew, 2.

<sup>66</sup> Patrick Luciani and Rudyard Griffiths, *American Power: Potential Limits in the 21st Century*, (Canada: Key Order Books, 2007), 47-57. Perkins states that corporations define our world, impact every nation, and its tentacles reach everywhere. "They make a show of "promoting democracy and transparency among the nations of the world." "They are "imperialistic dictatorships where a very few make all decisions and reap most of the profits." As a positive side, corporations have proven highly efficient at marshaling resources, inspiring collective creativity, and spreading webs of communications and distribution to most remote corners of the planet. See Perkins, 7-8.

<sup>67</sup> Ignatieff, 49. Authors like James Canton, *The Extreme Future*, and David Korten, *The Great Turning*, would recommend a grand strategy of cooperative security. Within a few decades, Bernan believes that the U.S. will be marginalized on the world stage with its hegemony “replaced by China or the European Union.” See Bernan.

<sup>68</sup> Figure 24. Grand Strategy Disillusion Syndrome. Based on ideas and information in Dueck, 26.

<sup>69</sup> Olsen, Intro.

<sup>70</sup> Kupchan.

<sup>71</sup> Dueck, 27.

<sup>72</sup> Lieber, 55.

<sup>73</sup> Dueck, 29.

<sup>74</sup> Lieber, 57

<sup>75</sup> Niall Ferguson, When Empire Wane: the End of Power, *Opinion Journal: From the Wall Street Journal*; available from <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244>; Internet: accessed 26 November 2007.

<sup>76</sup> Debt: The Cost and Funding the Global War on Terror, CSBA: available from: [http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20070118.Cost\\_of\\_the\\_Global/T.20070118.Cost\\_of\\_the\\_Global.pdf](http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20070118.Cost_of_the_Global/T.20070118.Cost_of_the_Global.pdf); Internet; accessed 15 December 2007. This information paper estimates the amount of funding for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere since 2001 is \$500 and still rising. As a comparison, the cost of the Vietnam War was 531 billion and World War II was 1.2 trillion. See Peter Grier, “The Rising Price of the War on Terror,” *The Christian Science Monitor*; available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1121/p01s03-usmi.html>; Internet: accessed 21 January 2008. “The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that dependent on the size of the troops deployed...the total cost of GWOT could reach between 1.2 and 1.7 trillion by 2017. See Laxman Kumar Bahara, “The Rising Cost of the Global War on Terror;” The Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis; available <http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/LaxmanBehera010108.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 January 2008.

<sup>77</sup> Hart, 27. China now possesses over 1.4 trillion U.S. dollars. What will they do with our currency? See Atlantic, JAN/FEB 2008. “The 1.4 Trillion Dollar Question?” 39.

<sup>78</sup> “The U.S. National Debt Clock;” available from [http://brillig.com/debt\\_clock/](http://brillig.com/debt_clock/); Internet; accessed 21 January 2008.

<sup>79</sup> “The Trade Deficit Report;” available from <http://www.americaneconomicalert>

.org/ticker\_home.asp; Internet; accessed on 20 November 2007. David Korten reports that the U.S. debt is growing by borrowing from foreigners at the rate of 2.6 billion dollars per business day. See Korten, 69.

<sup>80</sup> Hart, 27 and Korten, 61. David Korten states that the most optimistic estimates place the peak oil production at 35 years in the future and other believe that 2005 is the fateful year. Scientific American reports that there is only so much crude oil in the world and the oil industry has found at least 90% of it. See Scientific American and the Future of Energy, (Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2007), 4. Paul Roberts reports that America uses an energy trilogy of 40% oil, 26% coal, and 24% natural gas for its domestic needs. See Paul Roberts, *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World*, (Boston: Hough Mufflin Company/Mariner Books, 2005), 5-15.

<sup>81</sup> Burman, 20, Roberts, 15, Scientific American, 1, and Korten, 61. Paul Roberts contends that America could require 140 billion barrels of oil by 2035. Scientific American emphasizes that the end of cheap oil global production will probably begin to decline within ten years. David Korten states that the most optimistic estimates place the peak global oil production at 35 years in the future and other believe that 2005 is the fateful year.

<sup>82</sup> Burman, 20, Roberts, 7, and Scientific American, 8. Paul Roberts asserts that it may cost at least one trillion dollars to discover, produce, and refine new oil reserves. What will the U.S. do to protect its energy supplies? Roberts states that the U.S. might see itself having no choice but to defend its global energy infrastructure from any threat and using any means necessary. Scientific American suggests that energy prices will soar when oil supplies dry up. Global economics could be plunged into a recession as nations search for energy alternates.

<sup>83</sup> George Weigel, Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center and author of *Witness for Hope*. Advocates like Robert Zubrin and Paul Rogers both recommend adopting new American energy independence strategies. Zubrin states that we can win the war on terror by making oil obsolete. See Robert Zubrin, (Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror, New York: Prometheus Books), 2007. See Paul Roberts, *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World*, Boston: Hough, Mufflin Company/Mariner Books, 2005.

<sup>84</sup> Kathy Roth Douquet, "What is the U.S. Military Role?," *USA Today*, 18 September 2007, sec. A, p. 11A.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Trubowitz, 181.

<sup>87</sup> Hentz, 6.

<sup>88</sup> Hart, 22 and Lieber, 17.

<sup>89</sup> Figure 25. World Military Expenditures. Based on data collected from Source One: CIA – The World Fact Book 2006; Military Expenditures; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm>. Internet; accessed 21 OCT 2007. Source Two: A Comparison of Global Military Expenditures; available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_budget\\_of\\_the\\_People's\\_Republic\\_of\\_China#A\\_comparison](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China#A_comparison); Internet; accessed 21 October 2007.

<sup>90</sup> Ferguson, Wane and Lind,163.

<sup>91</sup> Boston Globe, “Army is worn too thin, says general. Calls force not ready to meet new threats;” available at [http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/09/27/army\\_is\\_worn\\_too\\_thin\\_says\\_general/](http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/09/27/army_is_worn_too_thin_says_general/): Internet, accessed 6 December 2007.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Deseret Morning News, “Air Force wants \$20 billion boost in budget,” February 19, 2008; available at <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695254271,00.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2008.

<sup>94</sup> Military Deployments Data from Source 1: Available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/deploy.htm>, Internet; accessed 17 December 2007, and Source 2 Accessed from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deployments\\_of\\_the\\_U.S.\\_Military](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deployments_of_the_U.S._Military). Military Deployments data available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/deploy.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Figure 26. World Wide U.S. Military Deployments. Adapted from the following sources available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/deploy.htm> and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deployments\\_of\\_the\\_U.S.\\_Military](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deployments_of_the_U.S._Military), Internet: both accessed 20 October 2007.

<sup>97</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-080354R “Military Force Structure” Report to Congressional Committees, 18 January 2008. The GAO Report announced that “in January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to expand the Army from a total of 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active and reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2013 – an increase of 74,200 military personnel – in order to meet increasing strategic demands and help reduce stress on the force.” See GAO Report, available from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08354r.pdf>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2008.

<sup>98</sup> According to the DOD Report “Active Duty Military Personnel Strength by Region and by Country” dated 30 September 2007, the U.S. has active duty personnel in close to 150 countries (including U.S. embassies). However, the Base Structure Report (BSR) only lists only 35 countries four territories. See Center for Defense Information

(CDI), "U.S. Military Bases in Foreign Nations: A Summary of the Pentagon Data," dated 16 November 2007; Available from <http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4140>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2008. The U.S. Army has about 243,000 soldiers stationed in 76 nations. See the 2008 Army Posture Statement, "Army Global Commitments," available from <http://www.army.mil/aps/07>; Internet: accessed 18 February 2008.

<sup>99</sup> Johnson, 151. Johnson estimates the number of U.S. overseas bases at 702. Chalmers Johnson uses the DOD Base Structure Report (BSR) which details the physical property owned by DOD and the Worldwide Manpower distribution by Geographical Area (Manpower Report) which gives the number of U.S. military personnel. However, the CDI estimates the number of U.S. bases overseas at around 825. See the Center for Defense Information (CDI) Report.

<sup>100</sup> The integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy proposes redeploying 70,000 troops to the U.S. (CONUS), and reducing overseas bases by 30%. This reduces European bases from 589 to 379 sites. The shift in strategic focus is from a Western to an Eastern European U.S. presence with the set goal of establishing an Eastern European rotational force and adding bases in Romania and Bulgaria. According to the "U.S. Military Overseas Bases: New Development Oversight Issues for Congress," a Congressional Research Service Report, the timeline to complete the realignment is from 2006 to 2011. The new trend is from building numerous permanent overseas U.S. bases to building more temporary bases. "These Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security locations will be located at global hot spots where rotational forces are deployed during unforeseen events and may not require a permanent presence of U.S. troops." See the Center for Defense Information (CDI) Report.

## CHAPTER V. WHAT IS THE FUTURE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE?

<sup>1</sup> Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 544.

<sup>2</sup> Daniel W. Drezner, "The Grandest Strategy of them All," *Washington Post*, 17 December 2006; available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/15/AR2006121501832.html>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Figure 27. American Global Supremacy Map. Adapted Brzezinski, 22. Also updated from with new data available from <http://www.navybuddies.com/navy/fleet.htm>; Internet; accessed on 21 OCT 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Edward A Olsen, *U.S. National Defense for the Twenty First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy*, (Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), intro. The power of a nation is also judged on its strength (Index of Power). The U.S. ranks 4th in Area, 3rd in

Population, 1st in GDP, 1st in Military Strength, 1st in Scientific Research, and 8th in Human Development. See

<sup>6</sup> Brown, 57.

<sup>7</sup> Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* (PA; Stackpole Books, 1999), 152.

<sup>8</sup> Brian Loveman, *Strategy for Empire: U.S. Regional Security Policy in the Post Cold War Era*, (United Kingdom: SR Books, 2004), p.48-49.

<sup>9</sup> National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Figure 28. The Security Environment Post 9-11. Illustrated diagram from the National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. Robert Art contends that “the greatest threat to the American homeland today comes from hostile states or terrorists armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.” See Art, 8.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*, (New York: Harvard University, 2005).

<sup>13</sup> Derek D. Smith, *Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of WMD*, (New York: Cambridge Press, 2006).

<sup>14</sup> Table 4. Strategic Threats Assessments. Based on information from *All Possible Wars? Towards a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment*, 2001-2005, Chapter 5, 2000. pp. 41-91, 189-208,

<sup>15</sup> Table 5. Strategic Assessment. Based on information from Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, (London: A Century Foundation Book, 2003), 79.

<sup>16</sup> Figure 29. Potential Challenging Scenarios. Adapted from: *All Possible Wars? Towards a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment*, 2001-2005, Chapter 5, 2000. pp. 41-91, 189-208, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; available at <http://www.edu/inss/macair/mcnair63/m63cvr.html>.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Touchstone Rockfeller Center, 1996). Blankley considers “the greatest danger is the ferment in Islam that is generating radical ideas in an unknown but growing percentage of grassroots Muslims around the world.” “We are facing a building culture and violent insurgency of radical Islamic right here in the West in

Euope and Asia." See Tony Blankley, *The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?* (Washington DC: Regency Publishing Inc, 2005), xiv.

<sup>19</sup> Barnett. Blankley states "a nation cannot design a rational response to a danger if the nature and the extent of the danger are not identified, widely reported and comprehended. The threat to the west is vastly more than just Bin Laden and Al Qaeda." See Blankley, xiv-xv.

<sup>19</sup> Canten. Gingrich states "we're standing on the edge of a potential golden age of America." Advances in technology, science, engineering, and medicine hold the promise of benefits our parents couldn't even dream of. If we make the right choices now, America will enjoy a level of prosperity, safety, and freedom unknown to previous generations." See Newt Gingrich, *Real Change: From a World that Fails to a World that Works*, (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing Inc, 2008)

<sup>20</sup> Ralph Peters, Ralph, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?*, (PA; Stackpole Books, 1999), 2-3. Paul Rogers argues that the security paradigm of western nation states "maintaining global status quo through economic and political dominance backed up by military forces reconfigured to emphasize rapid deployment, long range strikes, and counter-insurgency" is not sustainable over the long term." See Rogers, 78-100.

<sup>21</sup> CNN News, "U.S. official: Chinese test missile obliterates satellite," 19 January 2007; available from [http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/01/18/china.missile/index.html?eref=rss\\_topstories](http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/01/18/china.missile/index.html?eref=rss_topstories); internet; accessed 30 November 2007.

<sup>22</sup> BBC News, "Russia tests giant fuel air bomb," 12 September 2007; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6990815.stm>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2007.

<sup>23</sup> George Casey, General, *Guest Speaker Engagement at the Forum*, The JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 24 November 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Paul Rogers, *Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty First Century*. (Sterling: Pluto Press, 2000), 98. Paul Rogers asserts that "on present trends, anti-elite actions will be a core feature of the next 30 years – not so much a clash of civilizations, more an age of insurgencies." Rogers contends that "the security outlook for the west" stems mainly from rogue states, terrorists, and possibly China or Russia." "There is a perception that there may be an increasing tendency toward anti-elite rebellions, but it is much more common to view any anti-western action as motivated by religious fundamentalism or nationalism." See Rogers, 101

<sup>25</sup> Richard H. Schultz, Jr, ISS Fletcher School Professor, Tufts University, DHP 240, The Role of Force in International Politics, on 21 NOV 2007. Cited with permission.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Prem Jha Shankar, and Eric Hobsbawm, "The Twilight of the Nation State: Globalization, Chaos, and War," (London: Pluto Press, 2006).

<sup>28</sup> "The world's weakest states aren't just a danger to themselves. They can threaten progress and stability of countries half a world away." See Foreign Policy, (July/August 2007), "The Failed State Index 2007," available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3865](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865); Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>29</sup> Lifton, 131. Rogers asserts that "the widespread public perception that nuclear weapons are of a diminishing concern is fundamentally wrong – the danger of an all out nuclear war between two superpower alliances has diminished, but the prospects for a stable route to the world in which nuclear weapons are abolished or are even effectively controlled are, on present trends, minimal." After 9-11, the fear of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons or rogue states threatening their use or selling them to terrorists is now a large concern. See Rogers, 57.

<sup>30</sup> Joseph Gerson, *Empire and the Bomb: How the U.S. Uses Nuclear Weapons to Dominate the World*, London; Pluto Press, 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Bulletin On Line, *The Doomsday Clock*, The Society of Atomic Scientists, University of Chicago, Illinois; available from <http://www.thebulletin.org/>; Internet; accessed 21 October 2007. Robert Jay Lifton's Book "Super Power Syndrome" states that every nuclear age president has struggled with the "contradiction" of nuclear weapon use. Some scholars believe that "the likelihood of nuclear war is greater now that before the Berlin wall."

<sup>32</sup> Rogers, 57.

<sup>33</sup> Steve Guterman, "Russia Says Nuke Strikes Possible," AOL News; available at [http://news.aol.com/story/\\_a/russia-says-nuke-strikes-possible/20080119122509990001](http://news.aol.com/story/_a/russia-says-nuke-strikes-possible/20080119122509990001); Internet; accessed 20 January 2008.

<sup>34</sup> Lifton, 131-132. Paul Rogers contends that "The most worrying trend towards useable nuclear weapons - the idea of using small nuclear wars in far off places" by developing a generation of "new nuclear weapons designed for specific functions in conflicts in the third world." "Many analysts have argued that the most dangerous aspect of the cold war was the long term belief that a limited nuclear war could be fought and won. That mentality has endured beyond the end of the cold war and is deeply embedded in the strategic thinking of the nuclear powers." "The public perception that nuclear weapons were solely weapons of a last resort, was false." See Rogers, 12, 57

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>36</sup> Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 8.

<sup>37</sup> General George Casey, *Guest Speaker Engagement at the Forum*, The JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 24 November 2007.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Peters.

<sup>40</sup> Barnett, 9-58.

<sup>41</sup> Rogers, 130 and Barnett. Rogers states that the old security premise that naked force cures all global security ills may not work.

<sup>42</sup> Rogers, 57, and Barnett, 5, 9. Rogers contend that a deeply divided world faces a new global security environment of fanatical Islam, environmental constraints, and economic polarizations. Unless solutions are reached to get to the “core of the gap,” we face an unstable and conflict ridden future world. Barnett also shares this belief that we must deal with the “gap,” and also calls this “system perturbations.” Barnett also proposes a “new set of rules” to deal with the post cold war world.

<sup>43</sup> Schultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*, (New York: Columbia University, 2006), 1,10,11.

<sup>44</sup> Figure 29. Technology Influence on Grand Strategy. Figure based on ideas discussed with Professor Bill Martel, ISSP Professor, on “Technology and Grand Strategy” from an interview on 28 January 2008. Cited with permission.

<sup>45</sup> Martel. Cited with permission.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Figure 31. Conflict Fault Lines. Figure based on information from Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons/Penguin Group. 2004) and illustrated map is available at: <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm> Source 2: Internet: accessed 20 October 2007.

<sup>48</sup> Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Professor, DHP 245, Crisis Management and Complex Emergencies Seminar, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2 October 2007 and 4 December 2007. Cited with permission.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Figure 32. Grand Strategy Challenges. Based on information collected from Rogers, 119, and James Canton, *The Extreme Future: The Top Trends that will Reshape the World in the 20 Years*, (New York: A Plume Book, 2007), 4, 17, 333.

<sup>54</sup> Rogers, 119. Paul Rogers suggests developing a “new security paradigm around policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict. An the center must be a process of enhancing common global security based on action to be taken to reverse the socioeconomic, polarization, enhance sustainable economic development and control the process of proliferation and militarization.”

<sup>55</sup> If oil consumption rises at 2% per year using U.S. Department of Energy estimates, then existing oil supplies could disappear around 25-30 years. Global fresh water comprises about 3% of the earth’s water supply. With continued population growth, total human fresh water usage could reach 100% of the available supply by 2050. See Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 19-20.

<sup>56</sup> United Nations Global Forum, *The Dark Side of Natural Resources*; available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/minindx.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 October 2007. Scarce natural resources include oil, water, timber, gas, diamonds, and other minerals. David Korten states “the changing terms of warfare will bring an end to the ability of military powerful nations to seize with impunity the resources of weaker nations.” See Korten, 67, 71. The UN estimates the world population will grow from the current 6.4 billion to 8.9 billion by 2050. The estimated maximum human population that earth’s ecosystems can sustain is 12 billion which could be reached by 2050. See The Subversive and Conservative Science of Human Ecology; available at <http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~bramblet/ant301/sixa1.html>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2008.

<sup>57</sup> Korten, 34-35. David Korten states that we are running out of energy. Based on current production and consumption, technology, and trends, Korten contends that “we as a civilization do not have the existing or projected energy resources and production means needed to sustain growth, security, and productivity by 2040 – or possibly sooner. This includes all current energy resources and production sources, from oil to solar to nuclear. Unless we can be “linked to energy access, we are in deep trouble.” “If we were to start feverishly building nuclear reactors, solar, and wind farms, hydroelectric plants, and other renewable energy sources, we still would not be able to meet the rapidly expanding energy demands in thirty years.”

<sup>58</sup> United Nations. Climate change or global warming includes melting of the polar caps, sea level rising, rising temperatures, etc.

<sup>59</sup> Rogers, 85, and Korten, 67. David Korten reports that the per capita income fell in 54 of the world's poorest countries; "highest poverty rates increased 37% of the 67 reporting countries. More than 1.2 billion people now struggle to survive on less than \$1 per day and 2.8 billion survive on less than \$2 per day. The number of billionaires has increased from 244 in 1991 to 691 in 2005, with a combined net worth of 2.2 trillion dollars. It is estimated that 1.7 billion people (27% of humanity) currently enjoy the material affluence of the consume society."

<sup>60</sup> Rogers, 88-89, and Korten, 72. Paul Rogers reports that limits to global growth include pollution, the depleting ozone layer, desertification, deforestation, fresh water shortages, and the declining ecological capability of land to support human populations. David Korten includes declining fisheries, paving over arable land, soil loss, and declining soil fertility.

<sup>61</sup> James C. Gaston, *Grand Strategy and the Decision Making Process*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1992).

<sup>62</sup> Figure 33. Struggling America. Based on ideas and information from "the Decline and Fall of America, available at <http://www.buttery.org/mark/rants/decline-and-fall.html>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2008. "The struggling nation scenario is a direct result of the nation not preparing for future challenges that appeared on the horizon decades earlier." See Canton, 348-349.

<sup>63</sup> Canton, 348-350.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Barnett, 7, 21, 22. Canton, 229-230, and 339-351.

<sup>66</sup> Canton.

<sup>67</sup> Figure 34. Grand Strategy Future Maps. Based on ideas and information from Canton, James, *The Extreme Future: The Top Trends that will Reshape the World in the 20 Years*, (New York: A Plume Book, 2007), 23, 34, 48, 59, 81.

<sup>68</sup> Barnett, Korten, and Bill Bradley, *The New American Story*, (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks), 2007.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Barnett, 7, 21, 22.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Table 6. Future Global Visions. Based on ideas and information contained in Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, (Belmont: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2006), 512-519.

<sup>75</sup> Russett, 512-519.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> David T. Pyne, The American Partisan, "The Coming New World Order – Whose Vision Will Prevail?" Available from <http://www.american-partisan.com/cols/2002/pyne/qtr3/0801.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 February 2008.

<sup>80</sup> Canton.

<sup>81</sup> Table 6. Grand Strategy Matching. Based on ideas and information from Canton, Payne, Korten, 313-359, and Russett, 512-519.

## CHAPTER VI. WHAT ARE THE PROPOSED GRAND STRATEGIES?

<sup>1</sup> Gray, 12. Gray also asserts that "if strategy is poor, victory is always much more expensive to attain, than it should be. If indeed, victory is possible at all."

<sup>2</sup> Figure 35. Spectrum of Grand Strategies. Based on all collected strategies during the course of study. Major sources are Dueck, Hart, Brzezinski, Kennedy, Brown, and Art which list a great variety of grand strategies.

<sup>3</sup> Olsen, 192 and Hentz, 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> Isolationism has a variety of names. James J. Hentz's discusses this in detail in his book, "Obligation of Empire."

<sup>5</sup> Edward A. Olsen, *U.S. National Defense for the Twenty First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy*, (Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers. 2002). Olsen presents the case for isolationism in comprehensive detail in his book.

<sup>6</sup> Olsen, 192 and Hentz, 3-4.

<sup>7</sup> Trubowski, 160.

<sup>8</sup> Hentz, 155.

<sup>9</sup> Dueck, 116.

<sup>10</sup> Art, 173.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Hentz, 155.

<sup>13</sup> Dueck, 116.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Art, 195.

<sup>16</sup> Dueck, 116 and Hentz, 156.

<sup>17</sup> Dueck, 117.

<sup>18</sup> Hentz, 155.

<sup>19</sup> Brzezinski, 195.

<sup>20</sup> Art, 85.

<sup>21</sup> Hentz, 157.

<sup>22</sup> Art, 86.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Hentz, 34.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 57.

<sup>26</sup> Art, 89.

<sup>27</sup> Hentz, 4.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 34.

<sup>29</sup> Art, 123.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 161.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 122.

<sup>32</sup> Hentz, 35.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 36.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 40.

<sup>35</sup> Art, 121.

<sup>36</sup> Hentz, 35.

<sup>37</sup> Art, 139.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Art, 161-170.

<sup>40</sup> Hentz, 163.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>42</sup> Art, 246.

<sup>43</sup> Hentz, 163.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 164.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Brown, 26.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Hentz, 6.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>61</sup> Dueck, 119, and Gaddis, 89.

<sup>62</sup> Dueck, 119.

<sup>63</sup> Niall Ferguson, When Empire Wane: the End of Power, *Opinion Journal: From the Wall Street Journal*; available from <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244>; Internet; accessed 26 November 2007.

<sup>64</sup> Dueck, 119.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 120.

<sup>66</sup> Gaddis, 107.

<sup>67</sup> Art, 139.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Art, 139.

<sup>70</sup> Dueck, 120.

<sup>71</sup> Art, 139.

<sup>72</sup> NSS.

<sup>73</sup> Art, 139.

<sup>74</sup> Table 8. Comparison of Grand Strategies. Based on ideas from Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, (London: A Century Foundation Book, 2003), 84.

<sup>75</sup> Table 9. American Versus Opposing Grand Strategies. Based on ideas and information presented in LTG John F. Kimmons (DCS, Department of the Army G-2), Briefing “Intelligence Transformation in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” delivered on 22 February 2008, at Harvard University, the JFK School of Government. Also based on ideas from Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, (Boston: SSI Harvard University, 23 May 2006).

<sup>76</sup> Economic advisors warn congress that the GWOT cost could well exceed \$2 trillion in the next ten years with much of it financed through borrowing, adding billions in interest charges. See Margaret Basher, “U.S. War on Terror Could Cost 2.4 Trillion by 2019”, *Muncie Free Press*; available from <http://www.munciefreepress.com/node/17808>; Internet; accessed 21 January 2008.

<sup>77</sup> Colin Dueck, “Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to Bush,” *World Policy Journal*, Article, Volume XX, No.4, (Winter 2003/2004). Colin Dueck contends that neither multi-lateral or unilateral efforts will succeed if America is unwilling to incur the full costs and risks. Dueck sees two U.S. alternates: (1) assume the burden of action on international rhetoric and convictions, or (2) keeps costs and risks to a minimum by abandoning ambitious intervention agenda. He states that America can not have a hegemony grand strategy “on the cheap.”

<sup>78</sup> Korten, 69-71. Korten contends that the U.S. is living high on borrowed money and is mortgaging its future to pay for its present. America has shifted from an industrialized nation to more of a consumer service nation. “In 1990s, the U.S. produced 90% of what it produced, by 2004 it produced 75% of what it produced, and the decline is accelerating.” Korten states that “the U.S. trade profile is increasing that of a third world country that exports commodities and imports finished goods.” French demographer Emmanuel Todd sees the U.S. as “a sort of black hole – absorbing merchandise and capital but incapable of furnishing the same goods in return.” See Emmanuel Todd, *After the Empire*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

<sup>79</sup> Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA); available from <http://www.comw.org/pda/index.Html>; Internet; accessed 18 November 2007. This project proposes reducing future military force structure when cheap credit disappears.

<sup>80</sup> The Quadrennial Defense Review: Rethinking the U.S. Posture) outlines world threat assessments and recommends military force capabilities for the 21st Century. See the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA); available from <http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20051024.QDR06/R.20051024.QDR06.pdf>; Internet; accessed 17 November 2007.

<sup>81</sup> What is the correct premise on America’s global status? Are we at the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end of PAX Americana? Are we beginning a new era (a new stage of American leadership) or is America in the decline? Advocates of Empire believe that the era of PAX Americana began after the Cold War.

"Unanticipated paradigms by the planners of Pax Americana, include elite diaspora, peacekeeping missions, "new wars," "strange wars," "leveling crowds," terrorism and political army states, i.e., unanticipated new patterns of migration, military violence, political protest and even threatened foundations of sovereignty." See University of Chicago: Anthropology Department; available at <http://anthropology.uchicago.edu/courses/faculty/kelly.shtml>; Internet; accessed 8 December 2007.

## CHAPTER VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup> Patrick J. Buchanan, *A Republic Not an Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny*, (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 1995) and from John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). In 1939, U.S. historian Charles A. Beard was concerned that if America was drawn into WWII conflict by imperial temptation, it might become the roots for a conquest for empire and forfeiting its true vocation as a Great Republic. "Beard was concerned about the obligations and implications for having a U.S. empire – the enormous moral, political, economic, and military responsibilities. Have Beard's fears come true? The grand illusion for America was that "the charming belief that the U.S. could reap the benefits of empire without paying for the costs of empire and without admitting that it was an empire." Is America the new Rome?

<sup>2</sup> Dueck, 18-43.

<sup>3</sup> Princeton Project, The, Francis Fukuyama, and G. John Ikenberry, *The Princeton Project on National Security: Report of the Working Group on Grand Strategy Choices*; available from <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/GSC.pdf> and <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf>; Internet, Accessed 18 November 2007.

<sup>4</sup> International critics assert that America is already in rapid decline. Robert Art contends that America might have 20 -30 years before losing its considerable edge over others. America should cultivate a new favorable world order before its power and influence eventually fades into history. See Art, 2 and 248. Charles Kupchan states that "Great powers come and go. No one stays on top forever. One of the reasons that America's moment will be short lived is that history is moving more quickly than it used to. The countries that go into the digital age go into fast forward." See Charles Kupchan, "The Decline and Fall of the American Empire." Available from <http://dir.salon.com/story/books/int/2002/12/02/kupchan/>; Internet: accessed 12 February 2008. Ian Welsh's article "In the end, America will follow its own unique path. All republics end and so do empires." Available from Ianthath<sup>http://atypicalguy.wordpress.com/2007/12/31/the-fall-of-the-american-empire/</sup>; Internet; accessed 14 February 2008.

<sup>5</sup> James Clavell, *The Art of War - Sun Tzu*, (New York: The Dell Publishing, 1983).